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THE PRIORITIZATION OF CRIMINAL OVER CIVIL
COUNSEL AND THE DISCOUNTED DANGER
OF PRIVATE POWER
KATHRYN A. SABBETH

*

ABSTRACT
This Article seeks to make two contributions to the literature on the role of counsel.
First, it brings together civil Gideon research and recent studies of collateral consequences.
Like criminal convictions, civil judgments result in far-reaching collateral consequences,
and these should be included in any evaluation of the private interests that civil lawyers
protect. Second, this Article argues that the prioritization of criminal defense counsel over
civil counsel reflects a mistaken view of lawyers’ primary role as a shield against government power. Lawyers also serve a vital role in checking the power of private actors. As private actors increasingly take over public functions, their ubiquity in civic life and power over
the lives of individuals grows, and the need to check that power deserves increased attention.
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INTRODUCTION
The fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright1 renewed debates regarding the absence of a right to counsel in civil cases.2 Just a
few years earlier, the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner v. Rogers
reaffirmed the Court’s divergent approaches to the appointment of
criminal and civil counsel.3 Although the Court had previously indicated that the criminal defendant’s liberty interest was the key factor
animating the right to counsel,4 when faced with a civil litigant presenting a liberty interest, the majority shifted course and ruled that
there would still be no bright-line guarantee of counsel in civil cases.5
The decision to back away from physical liberty as the litmus test
presents an opportunity to consider more carefully the values that do
and should animate the appointment of counsel.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (recognizing the right to stateappointed counsel for criminal defendants).
2. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the Courts in
Delivering Access to Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 36-37 (2013) (describing the civil
right to counsel movement and recent advocacy); Earl Johnson Jr., 50 Years of Gideon, 47
Years Working Toward a “Civil Gideon,” 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 47, 48-49 (2013). While
recognizing that many advocates distinguish between a “civil right to counsel” and “Civil
Gideon,” see NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, Gideon v. Wainwright and Civil
Right to Counsel, civilrighttocounsel.org/about/criminal_and_civil_rights_to_counsel, this
Article will use the terms interchangeably.
3. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011). This Article uses the term “criminal counsel” to refer to attorneys representing criminal defendants and the term “civil
counsel” to refer to attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants in civil matters. For a discussion
of the importance of counsel representing civil plaintiffs, see infra pp. 934-36.
4. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (“[I]t is the defendant’s interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to appointed counsel . . . .”);
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (“[A]ctual imprisonment is a penalty different
in kind . . . and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”).
5. The Turner majority highlighted several factors that influenced its decision.
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517-19. It included three factors previously laid out in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), as determinative of the procedural safeguards fundamental
fairness generally requires: “(1) [T]he nature of the private interest that will be affected, (2)
the comparative risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest with and without additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interest in not providing additional or substitute procedural requirement[s].”
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517-18 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Turner majority also emphasized three new factors: (1) the complexity
of the proceeding, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (asserting that the “question [at issue] . . . in many . . .
cases is sufficiently straightforward to warrant determination prior to providing a defendant with counsel”) (punctuation omitted); (2) the identity of the opposing party and the
absence of opposing counsel—two factors which ought to be distinguished, see infra Part
III, but which the Turner majority blended, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (“[T]he person opposing the
defendant at the hearing is not the government represented by counsel but the custodial
parent unrepresented by counsel.”) (punctuation omitted); and (3) the availability of “substitute procedural safeguards” that could meet due process requirements in lieu of appointed counsel, id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). For critiques of the Court’s application
of these factors, see sources cited infra notes 91-93.
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This Article examines the relative importance assigned to civil
and criminal counsel and asks whether this assignment appropriately reflects the role of counsel in a system of justice. Although it reviews the constitutional law framework as background, this Article
does not propose an extension of the doctrine or articulate a new theory of interpretation. Neither does it advocate specific law reform.
This Article, instead, offers a critique of the terms of the debate. In
particular, it critiques two elements.
First, it suggests that civil Gideon advocates and criminal justice
scholars should consider the collateral consequences of civil judgments. Courts and scholars have recently begun to recognize the significance of collateral consequences of criminal convictions. This Article highlights that civil judgments, too, result in far-reaching collateral consequences. These consequences should be considered in any
comparison of the interests that civil and criminal lawyers protect.
Second, it argues that the prioritization of criminal over civil
counsel reflects a mistaken view of lawyers’ primary role as a shield
against government power. Lawyers also serve a vital role in checking the power of private actors. While previous scholarship has argued for and against a right to appointed civil counsel,6 most have
agreed that the appointment of counsel depends on the weight of the
private interests at stake,7 and a focal point of the discussion has
been the comparative value of the private interests.8 This Article,
6. See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform),
62 FLA. L. REV. 1227 (2010); Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging AppointedCounsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 991 (2012) (“Some
exceptional civil cases may merit counsel, either because they are particularly complex or
because they are otherwise especially important or meritorious. But these determinations
demand case-by-case judgments, not blanket constitutional rules.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Judicial Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
325, 335 (2010); John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, Response, It’s Not Triage if the Patient
Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 40, 41-44 (2012), http://www.pennlawreview.com/
online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-40.pdf (critiquing case-by-case approach to appointment in civil cases); DAVID UDELL & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ACCESS
TO
JUSTICE:
OPENING
THE
COURTHOUSE
DOOR
(2007),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48493.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Barton & Bibas, supra note 6, at 970 (“Given the importance of the liberty interest in Turner, the Court’s decision leaves little room for advocates to insist that a
lesser liberty interest qualifies for Gideon’s protections.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION
112A (2006) [hereinafter ABA RES.], available at http://abanet.org/leadership/2006/annual/
onehundredtwelvea.doc (recommending counsel in adversarial proceedings regarding shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody). Cf. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is
Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1354-56 (2011) (arguing that a “hard [constitutional]
floor” for right to counsel in immigration proceedings should turn on factors of liberty and
stigma interests as well as potential for bias).
8. A small literature has also tackled questions of efficiency, asking what activities
lawyers actually perform and whether substitutes, such as paralegals or technology for pro
se parties, would result in comparable outcomes. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L.
Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 11113 (collecting literature). Yet much of that literature does not address interests beyond
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however, shifts the emphasis from the private interests at stake to
the presence of an adversary with the potential for abuse of power.
The doctrine on the appointment of counsel reflects not only what
kinds of private interests we value but also concern with regard to
the dangers posed by one adversary in particular: the State. The prioritization of criminal counsel reflects a judgment that the State is
the primary adversary that people face and that the State’s role in
people’s lives is primarily as an adversary. Within this framework,
the most noble, important work a lawyer can do is ward off the intrusions of the government.
Yet this Article will argue that lawyers serve an equal, if not
greater, societal role protecting people against private actors. The
emphasis on government power, and the prioritization of lawyers
protecting against the State, neglects the significance of private power and the ways in which lawyers guard against its abuse. Private
actors control access to essential goods and services as well as information and communication mechanisms that facilitate participation
in democratic society.9 Private entities have also taken over aspects
of the criminal justice system, including policing and incarceration.10
The power of these private actors, like the power of government actors, is subject to abuse when left unchecked. As private actors’ control over civil society grows,11 lawyers serve an increasingly vital role
in checking private power.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the landscape of
federal constitutional rights governing appointment of counsel. It explains how the rights for criminal defendants and civil litigants developed along different tracks, with the former defined by rules and
the latter left to discretionary standards. In the criminal context, appointment of counsel depends on the nature and stage of proceedings.
While nuanced, the rule provides a definite trigger for appointment.
In contrast, in the civil context, appointment of counsel depends on a
case-by-case assessment of costs and benefits. While criminal counsel
has been recognized as a necessity of a functioning and legitimate
justice system, civil counsel is treated as an added benefit to be provided if a legislature or court is so inclined.12 After excavating the
individual case outcomes, such as dignitary interests, collateral consequences of proceedings, or broader societal implications. See id. (arguing for definition of “effectiveness” that
includes more than individual case outcomes).
9. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 238, 252-55 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1371-73 (2003) (highlighting the “new reality of privatized government” and collecting related literature). For a discussion of privatization, see infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
12. This Article focuses on rights recognized under the United States Constitution.
Some state courts and legislatures have recognized and created more expansive rights

2015]

CRIMINAL OVER CIVIL COUNSEL

893

doctrinal underpinnings of the right to counsel, this Article sets them
aside. It takes a step back from discussions of the right to counsel
and explores the role that counsel serves. The main of this Article
examines and critiques the values that underlie the prioritization of
criminal over civil counsel.13
The comparative weight of the private interests at stake in criminal and civil proceedings is the most common rationale for the difference in treatment. Part II therefore compares these private interests.
While recognizing that the importance of life and liberty is difficult to
overstate, Part II.A builds on previous work that questions the categorical prioritization of physical liberty over all interests at stake in
civil proceedings.
This Article then deepens the comparative analysis of private interests by introducing new research on collateral consequences,
which previous discussions of civil counsel have not considered.
Growing research suggests that the civil collateral consequences of
criminal convictions—such as exclusions from housing and employment—have been increasing in number and scope and that the impact of such collateral consequences may have eclipsed that of incarceration.14 Even the Supreme Court has taken note of this phenomenon and of attorneys’ expanding obligations to advise accordingly.
The recognition of civil collateral consequences has interesting implications for discussions of the role of civil counsel. First, to the extent
that there is increasing recognition of the importance of counsel’s assistance in dealing with civil consequences collateral to criminal proceedings, it raises the question of whether counsel’s assistance is
equally important in proceedings that address these interests directly. That is, if persons need lawyers to negotiate the immigration, emunder state constitutions, statutes, and court rules, so a litigant may have a broader right
to counsel depending on where he or she is located. See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State
Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245
(2006); Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel
Decisions, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 186 (2006); John Pollock, The Case Against Case-byCase: Courts Identifying Categorical Rights to Counsel in Basic Human Needs Civil Cases,
61 DRAKE L. REV. 763, 813-15 (2013) (describing state courts finding a broad right to counsel under state constitutions). For a discussion of local pilot projects expanding the right to
counsel, see Engler, supra note 2, at 49-50.
13. See Engler, supra note 2, at 52 (“The right to appointed counsel must reflect our
societal values, rights, and interests. The proper response to scarcity is not to draw artificial lines based on unstated value systems such as a presumption that a criminal case is
always more important than a custody or eviction case, but to have an explicit conversation
as to which types of issues or interests are most important and why, paired with careful
analysis of what levels of intervention are necessary to protect those interests.”); John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of the Criminal Process, 79 YALE
L.J. 359, 359-60 (1970) (“American thought about criminal procedure is confined within a
prevailing ideology . . . [but analysis will] illustrate that our present assumptions are not
the inevitable truths they often seem to be.”) (footnote omitted).
14. See infra notes 152-64, 184-85 and accompanying text.

894

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:889

ployment, or housing consequences of criminal convictions, might
they need lawyers in immigration, employment or housing proceedings? Second, and even more significantly, not only criminal convictions but also civil judgments result in collateral consequences. Empirical evidence suggests that civil judgments result in economic exclusion and social stigma with far-reaching effects. Further research
would be needed to make a comparative assessment of the collateral
consequences of criminal and civil proceedings. In any case, the recent emphasis on collateral consequences at least partially undercuts
the assumption that criminal and civil cases are categorically different.
Part III suggests that a crucial factor animating the prioritization
of criminal over civil counsel is a concern with checking State power.
An imbalance of power between adversaries can undermine the functionality and legitimacy of the adversarial system, and in a criminal
proceeding, the adversary of the individual is the State. There are
two ways to interpret the danger posed by the State in this context.
First, pitting a prosecuting attorney against an unrepresented layperson necessarily creates an imbalance. Yet lawyers are routinely
pitted against unrepresented laypersons in civil litigation as well; the
fact that the government adversary is represented does not sufficiently distinguish it from a private adversary. A second interpretation appears more robust: the concern with counter-balancing government power reflects a political view that such power poses unique
dangers. Part III concludes that the prioritization of criminal over
civil counsel reflects a view of lawyers as primarily defenders against
government power.
Part IV, however, challenges the accuracy of this perspective and
the wisdom of the prioritization. While lawyers are indeed needed to
check government power, disproportionate emphasis on this function
creates an incomplete portrait. It neglects other vital functions that
lawyers serve, namely that of checking the power of private actors.
Part IV.A highlights dynamics between private adversaries, showing
that imbalances of power are not confined to interactions with the
State. On the contrary, patterns of unequal relationships between
private parties abound. As private entities increasingly take over
public functions, the scope of their power grows. So does the need for
lawyers to check that power. Part IV.B calls attention to the potential
function of the State as more than a prosecutor: the State can also
serve to provide protection and support that private individuals cannot obtain on their own in civil society. The State can regulate power
imbalances that would otherwise exist between private parties, and
lawyers can play a crucial role in enforcing such regulation.
Part V suggests that more attention should be devoted to this role.
Lawyers serve to balance inequalities of power not only between the
people and the State but also between the people and other private
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actors. Devaluation of the importance of counsel in civil cases undercuts the role of lawyers who check private power. Part V emphasizes
lawyers’ participation in affirmative litigation as one means of checking abuses of power and concludes with a modest recommendation to
broaden the impact of such work.
I. DIVERGENT DOCTRINE ON CRIMINAL AND CIVIL COUNSEL
As is mentioned regularly in popular culture, criminal defendants
unable to afford counsel will be provided with counsel at the expense
of the State.15 This principle was first confirmed with respect to federal defendants in Johnson v. Zerbst16 and then with respect to state
defendants in the now-famous case of Gideon v. Wainright.17 In broad
language, the Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he right to be
heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel,”18 and “reason and reflection require
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice” the
necessity of counsel for a “fair trial” is “an obvious truth.”19 This
commitment to the necessity of criminal defense counsel is a brightline rule that applies even if the jail time is as short as one day.20
With respect to counsel for civil litigants, however, the Supreme
Court has expressed far more ambivalence.21 It is not that counsel
may never be appointed in civil cases but that, in federal constitutional jurisprudence, there is a presumption against appointment,
and overcoming that presumption depends on a case-by-case balancing of costs and benefits. While the provision of counsel in criminal
matters is governed by bright-line rules, in civil cases it is left to discretionary standards, if it is addressed at all.

15. See Ronald Steiner et al., The Rise and Fall of the Miranda Warnings in Popular
Culture, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219, 222-31 (2011). Research suggests Americans also mistakenly believe that civil litigants are entitled to counsel. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Will Gideon’s Trumpet Sound a New Melody? The Globalization of Constitutional Values and Its
Implications for a Right to Equal Justice in Civil Cases, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 201,
241 n.95 (2003) (collecting empirical sources); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1792 (2001).
16. 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
17. 372 U.S. 335, 339-40, 342 (1963).
18. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
19. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
20. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (ruling that the right to counsel is triggered by sentence of imprisonment); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (ruling
that misdemeanor charges, with jail time of less than one year, trigger the right to appointed counsel).
21. See Brooke D. Coleman, Prison Is Prison, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2399, 2418
(2013).
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A. Counsel for Criminal Defendants
In criminal cases, the cost-benefit approach to appointment of
counsel was considered but ultimately rejected. In 1932, the Supreme
Court in Powell v. Alabama22 found a need for the appointment of
counsel based on the particular facts of the case.23 The Court ruled
that “in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like,”24 appointment of counsel is a “necessary requisite of due process of law.”25
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,26 the Court moved towards a
bright-line approach, ruling that, pursuant to the dictates of the
Sixth Amendment, counsel must be appointed in federal cases without any case-specific inquiry.27 Noting that Mr. Johnson “conducted
his defence [sic] about as well as the average layman usually does in
cases of a similar nature,”28 the Court determined that the Sixth
Amendment “embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth
that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill
to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take
his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.”29 The Court concluded that a federal
court cannot “deprive an accused [defendant] of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel.”30
Just four years later, however, in Betts v. Brady,31 the Court ruled
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
always mandate a bright-line rule for the appointment of counsel.32
Mr. Betts had been indicted for robbery, and when he requested appointment of counsel, the trial judge denied the request because the
case did not involve rape or murder.33 The Supreme Court ruled that
the Sixth Amendment applies only in federal courts,34 and, while the
deprivation of counsel could be found to constitute a due process violation on a case-by-case basis,35 the appointment of counsel was not
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Powell, 287 U.S. at 45.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id.
304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
Id.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 463.
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Id. at 471.
Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462-64.

2015]

CRIMINAL OVER CIVIL COUNSEL

897

necessarily required of the states.36 To hold otherwise, the majority
reasoned, “would be to impose . . . a requirement without distinction
between criminal charges of different magnitude or in respect of
courts of varying jurisdiction.”37 The majority explained, “The question we are now to decide is whether due process of law demands that
in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State must
furnish counsel to an indigent defendant. Is the furnishing of counsel
in all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental
principles of fairness?”38 The majority decided that it is not.39
Even the dissenting opinion shrank from professing an absolute
rule.40 Although it urged a different result, it grounded its conclusion
in the particular facts of the case.41 It highlighted that the petitioner
was “a farm hand”42 and “a man of little education,”43 who faced
charges of a serious crime.44 Though his dissent included broader
language,45 Justice Black specified that he reached his conclusion “in
view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of his [the
defendant’s] trial and conviction.”46
For two decades following Betts v. Brady, appointment of criminal
defense counsel was provided on a bright-line basis in federal courts
but a case-by-case basis in state courts.47 Then Gideon v. Wainwright48 arrived and changed the landscape. Although the Court
found no special circumstances,49 it concluded that Mr. Gideon’s due
36. Id. at 471-72.
37. Id. at 473. The majority went on to state, “[A]s the Fourteenth Amendment extends the protection of due process to property as well as to life and liberty, if we hold with
the petitioner, logic would require the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving property.” Id.
38. Id. at 464.
39. Id. at 473.
40. See id. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting) (“To hold that the petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in this case does not require us to say that no trial for any offense, or
in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel. This case can be determined by a resolution of a narrower question:
whether in view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of his trial and conviction, this petitioner was denied the procedural protection which is his right under the Federal Constitution. I think he was.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 474-76.
42. Id. at 474.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 476.
45. See id. at 475-77.
46. Id. at 474.
47. The exception was where states chose to mandate appointment of counsel by statute. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (referencing different states’
approaches).
48. Id. at 339.
49. See id. at 337 (noting that Mr. Gideon “conducted his defense about as well as
could be expected from a layman”); see also id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The Court
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process rights had been violated because the aid of counsel is “fundamental” to a “fair trial.”50 The Court held that the fairness and due
process principles of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
protections of the Sixth Amendment,51 and the bright-line guarantee
of appointed counsel did apply to the states.52 Betts v. Brady was
overruled.53 Following Gideon, the approach to appointment of counsel became more like that with which the public is familiar today: a
bright-line guarantee.54
The rule governing the right to counsel operates with an automatic trigger,55 and applies regardless of costs and other factors.56 The
appointment does not turn on judicial discretion or an assessment of
the underlying facts of the particular case. The merits of potential
defenses will not be considered. Neither will the expense of the appointment, nor the individual defendant’s capacity to represent himself or herself pro se. The criminal defendant’s right to counsel has an
“absolute” value in the sense that it necessarily outweighs any value
on the opposite side of the ledger.

has come to recognize . . . that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted
in itself special circumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial.”).
50. Id. at 343-44.
51. Id. at 340-41.
52. Id. at 342.
53. See id. at 343-44.
54. See id. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The special circumstances rule has been
formally abandoned in capital cases, and the time has now come when it should be similarly abandoned in noncapital cases, at least as to offenses which, as the one involved here,
carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence.”).
55. The right is triggered during custodial interrogations, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966), at preliminary hearings, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970), and after formal charges have been filed,
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964). It applies on a first appeal, Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963), but not subsequent, discretionary appeals, Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974), and not for civil, post-conviction petitions. Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1989). Notably, the right is limited to cases involving imprisonment. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979).
56. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-73 (“In Argersinger the Court rejected arguments that
social cost or a lack of available lawyers militated against its holding . . . [and] conclu[ded]
that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a
criminal trial unless an indigent defendant ha[s] been offered appointed counsel to assist in
his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such a rule.” (citing Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32, 33, 37 n.7, 41 (1972))). But cf. John D. King, Beyond “Life and
Liberty”: The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2013) (arguing
that judges and prosecutors have the discretion not to pursue incarceration and, therefore,
the incarceration rule of Scott, 440 U.S. 367, allows them to undercut the right to counsel).
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B. Counsel for Civil Litigants
In civil matters there is no federal constitutional guarantee of appointed counsel.57 There is only a right to judicial consideration of
such appointment on an individualized, case-by-case basis.58 This approach reflects the relatively lower status the Court has accorded to
civil counsel.
The Supreme Court addressed the question of appointment of
counsel for civil litigants two decades after Gideon.59 In Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services of Durham County,60 the state of North
Carolina had threatened to permanently terminate a mother’s parental rights but appointed no attorney to represent her at the proceeding where the decision would be made.61 The mother was left to defend herself, and the sufficiency of her mothering, on her own.62 Ms.
Lassiter lost the case, along with all ties to her child.63 On appeal,
Ms. Lassiter’s advocates challenged the termination in the absence of
counsel, presenting procedural due process arguments grounded in
the Fourteenth Amendment.64 The majority of the Court was not
convinced.65
In analyzing the right to counsel, the Lassiter majority did not apply Gideon66 or its precedent.67 Instead, the Justices looked to

57. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (“This Court has long held
that the Sixth Amendment grants an indigent defendant the right to state-appointed counsel in a criminal case . . . [b]ut the Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases. . . . [T]he
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural
protections than in a criminal case.”) (citations omitted).
58. See id. at 2517 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see also id.
at 2520. The argument for counsel for civil parties has focused on the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; equal protection theories of court access have met little
success. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1461-63 (2d ed. 1988);
Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor’s Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REV. 651
(1981).
59. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332-34 (1985) (ruling that statute barring attorneys’
fees over ten dollars for veterans seeking disability benefits did not violate veterans’ due
process rights because cases did not necessarily require representation by counsel); Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (“[The] right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law.”).
60. 452 U.S. at 18.
61. Id. at 20-22.
62. See id. at 23.
63. Id. at 24.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 32-33.
66. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
67. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
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Mathews v. Eldridge,68 a case concerning the termination of social
security payments.69 Decided five years before Lassiter, Mathews had
ruled that a person receiving social security disability payments was
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of payments.70 The majority in Mathews had determined that “the benefit
of an additional safeguard to the individual affected . . . and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be
outweighed by the cost.”71
Unlike Gideon and related authority, which were based in broad
principles of fundamental rights in an adversary system,72 Mathews
approached due process as a balance between private interests and
those of governmental institutions.73 The Mathews decision set forth
the following three factors to determine the level of process due before the deprivation of a private interest:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.74

The Lassiter majority applied these Mathews factors but added a
new twist.75 In considering the first factor, Lassiter acknowledged the
“unique”76 importance of a “parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children.’ ”77
Nonetheless, the majority ruled that the significance of that interest
did not match the criminal defendant’s interest in physical liberty,
and the Court added the absence of a threat to physical liberty as a

68. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
69. Id. at 323.
70. Id. at 349.
71. Id. at 348. For criticisms of the Mathews v. Eldridge approach to due process, see
TRIBE, supra note 58, at 714-15 (describing “overtly utilitarian interest-balancing” as a
relatively recent approach to due process and one which is at odds with core purposes of
the clause); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46, 47 n.61 (1976) (identifying equality and dignity as values of due
process beyond accuracy).
72. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
73. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
74. Id. at 335.
75. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 (1981); see id. at 42 n.9
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing distortion of Mathews test).
76. Id. at 27.
77. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
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fourth factor, which weighed against the appointment of counsel.78
The Court described physical liberty as an exception that translates
the right to counsel into the right to appointed counsel.79 While due
process might require lower courts to appoint counsel in some parental termination proceedings on a case-by-case basis, there was to be
no absolute right.
After Lassiter, lower courts recognized physical liberty as the line
in the sand.80 The Lassiter decision underscored that physical liberty
was exceptional and suggested that no other interest would justify
the appointment of counsel. Some advocates therefore abandoned
federal constitutional arguments, turning instead to state constitutions or state legislatures for recognition of a right to appointed counsel in civil cases.81 Others accepted the physical liberty distinction of
Lassiter but used it affirmatively, drawing attention to civil cases
with a physical liberty interest at stake.82
This latter argument was tested in the Supreme Court in 2011.83
Turner v. Rogers involved a father ordered to pay child support and
then found guilty of civil contempt after he failed to pay.84 The lower
court sentenced Mr. Turner to a jail term of one year.85 On appeal
from the contempt order, he argued that the denial of appointed
counsel at the contempt hearing violated his right to due process.86
The majority ruled in his favor, but not on the grounds some advocates had hoped.87 In spite of the liberty interest at stake, the Court
applied the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, and it refused to
78. See id. at 30-31.
79. See id. at 25.
80. See Pollock, supra note 12, at 765 n.5 (collecting court decisions that interpreted
Lassiter to create a presumption for appointment in cases involving a threat to physical
liberty).
81. A number of these efforts were successful, and the majority of states now provide
counsel to indigent parents facing parental termination proceedings. See supra note 12 and
sources cited therein. More recently, a number of states and localities have begun pilot
projects, broadening the provision of counsel to other categories of cases. See Engler, supra
note 2, at 49-50 (describing pilot projects).
82. See, e.g., Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 134-35, 138-40 (2008).
83. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
84. Id. at 2513.
85. Id. Mr. Turner served this one-year term in its entirety, and that was only the
latest in a string of six civil contempt findings due to failures to pay the same child support
order. Id. at 2513-14. Three of the previous orders resulted in prison sentences, two for
several days each because he was released after paying, and another for six months, which
he served in full. Id. By the time the Supreme Court issued its decision related to his additional, one-year incarceration, Mr. Turner had been found guilty of civil contempt a seventh time, had served an additional six months in prison, and was scheduled to appear for
an eighth contempt hearing. Id. at 2515.
86. See id. at 2514.
87. Id. at 2512.
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issue any bright-line rule for the appointment of counsel in civil cases.88 The decision interpreted Lassiter not as mandating appointment
of counsel where liberty is at stake, but merely indicating that the
absence of a liberty interest creates a presumption against appointment.89 The Turner majority also injected the analysis of the right to
civil counsel with new considerations, all of which, it concluded,
weighed against a bright-line rule90: (1) the question at issue was
“sufficiently straightforward to warrant determination prior to
providing a defendant with counsel”;91 (2) the “person opposing the
defendant at the hearing [wa]s not the government represented by
counsel but the custodial parent unrepresented by counsel”;92 and (3)
“substitute procedural safeguards” were available to meet due process requirements.93 The majority explained that its holding, denying
a bright-line right to counsel to civil litigants facing imprisonment,
was limited by application of these factors.94
Despite its refusal to recognize any guaranteed right to civil counsel, the majority reversed the decision below because insufficient
“procedural safeguards” had been made available to Mr. Turner.95
The decision suggested that safeguards might have included: notice
that ability to pay is a major focus of the contempt proceeding; a form
to elicit relevant financial information; an opportunity to respond to
questions about his financial status; an express finding by the court
that the defendant has the ability to pay; or assistance of a “neutral
social worker” or other appropriate layperson.96 Here, the family
court order pursuant to which Mr. Turner was incarcerated failed

88. Id. at 2517-18.
89. Id. at 2516.
90. Id. at 2518.
91. Id. at 2519 (punctuation omitted). But see Laura K. Abel, Turner v. Rogers and the
Right of Meaningful Access to the Courts, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 805 (2012) (questioning the
Court’s assumptions about the lack of complexity and highlighting contrary evidence in the
record).
92. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (punctuation omitted). The mother of Mr. Turner’s child
had initiated the child support proceeding, and her father pursued it at the Supreme
Court, having later gained custody of the child. Id. at 2513, 2519. As Judith Resnik has
highlighted, however, the government had a significant role in the case. See Judith Resnik,
Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner
v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 97-98 (2011) (explaining that state and federal legislation
compelled the mother, as a recipient of welfare benefits, to pursue Mr. Rogers, and a representative of the Department of Social Services appeared at least once in the underlying
proceeding).
93. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)). But see Abel, supra note 91 (arguing that the Court should have used empirical
evidence to evaluate the adequacy of alternatives).
94. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
95. Id. at 2521.
96. Id. at 2519.
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even to articulate whether he was able to pay, a basic prerequisite to
a contempt finding.97
The Supreme Court’s reversal was based not on a broad right to
counsel when liberty is at stake but on the particular inadequacies of
the lower court’s findings.98 Not one of the nine Justices voted to recognize a bright-line right to civil counsel.99 Turner downplayed not
only the importance of physical liberty100 but, even more, the necessity of civil counsel.101
C. Constitutional Mandate
One might argue that the divergence in approaches to civil and
criminal counsel flows from the plain language of the U.S. Constitution. Civil cases regarding the right to counsel are analyzed with the
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge102 because the Fourteenth
Amendment has been interpreted as the only available Constitutional hook for civil litigants, while criminal defendants avoid such
weighing of costs and benefits because they enjoy the clearer guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. This argument appears plausible at
first blush.
The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence [sic].103

This language refers explicitly to criminal prosecutions. The text confers no right to civil parties.104

97. Id. at 2510; see also Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 638 n.9 (1988) (ruling that the
court may not impose punishment in civil contempt proceeding where the defendant is
unable to comply with the order).
98. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
99. See id. at 2520.
100. For a discussion of the importance of physical liberty, see infra Part II.A.
101. Some might reasonably argue that this is part of a broader loss of interest in the
role of counsel, see generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986), but recent cases demonstrate that, at least in its rhetoric, the Court continues to uphold the important role of criminal counsel as vital to the
American justice system. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); Missouri v.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
102. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
104. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516.
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Yet this argument overlooks an important part of how the right to
counsel has developed. The right to counsel for criminal defendants,
too, is dependent on and limited by the Fourteenth Amendment.105
The authority for applying the Sixth Amendment to the states depends on the Fourteenth Amendment and a determination of the
fundamental liberties included therein.106 To make the guarantee apply equally to the states as to the federal government, a determination had to be made that it was required by due process.107
The reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment is especially clear for
criminal defendants’ right to appointed counsel.108 There is no question that the language of the Sixth Amendment guarantees some
form of a right to counsel.109 Yet to make that promise an affirmative
obligation, which requires the government not only to permit defendants to hire counsel but also to provide it for those unable to do so,
involves something more. The Court chose to find something more.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainright was grounded in a broad view of the role of counsel as essential to an adversarial
system of justice.110 No consideration was given to the possibility of
counsel in civil proceedings, so the Court did not distinguish between
criminal and civil contexts. However, the foundation of Gideon applies equally to both. The decision emphasized the “fundamental nature of the right to counsel” and that “reason and reflection” demonstrate the necessity of appointment of lawyers in an adversary system where the other side is represented.111
D. Bright-Line Rules or Discretionary Standards
As the foregoing review of constitutional doctrine has shown, the
criminal defendant’s access to counsel has been governed by a set of
bright-line rules, while the civil litigant’s access to counsel has depended on weighing costs and benefits. The method of analysis that
the Court has applied when considering the right to counsel for civil
litigants presumes that a bright-line guarantee is not even an option.112 Balancing tests are useful in providing flexibility, but brightline rules serve other social goals, such as ensuring certainty and
105. See supra Part I.A. (discussing development of right to criminal defense counsel).
106. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1963).
107. Id.
108. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
109. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
110. 372 U.S. at 344; see also Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69 (“The right to be heard would
be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”).
111. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44.
112. Cf. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 49 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The flexibility of due process, the Court has held, requires case-by-case consideration
of different decisionmaking contexts, not of different litigants within a given context.”).
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constraining the whims and biases of individual actors.113 These factors do not explain why we ought to take one approach to appointment of criminal counsel and another to appointment of civil
counsel.114
II. COMPARING PRIVATE INTERESTS AND INCLUDING
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
The traditional rationale for the categorical distinction between
criminal and civil cases is the private interests at stake for the criminal defendant.115 The criminal charge presents the possibility of a loss
of extraordinary social value, specifically the loss of life or physical
liberty.116 This Part will consider whether the interests at stake for
criminal defendants are categorically of higher value than the inter113. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1688-89 (1976). Some commentators would argue that certain rights are too
important to be subjected to cost-benefit analysis because, by definition, their sacrifice
fundamentally threatens the very fabric of and reason for maintaining a functioning society. See Markowitz supra note 7, at 1351, 1354 (suggesting that Mathews-style balancing is
“intuitively appealing” but noting that rights of criminal defendants require static rules).
This approach, however, begs the question of what value the interests have and assumes
that the benefits of protecting the interests necessarily exceed any costs. See MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT 39-47 (1996) (describing the view of constitutional
rights as trump cards).
114. One might argue that arbitrariness raises special constitutional problems in the
criminal context, but this depends on the presumption of privileging certain constitutional
values and does not answer the deeper question. With respect to the issue of bias, despite
the common assumption, there is no evidence that judges are biased against criminal defendants any more than against poor people generally. See Marc Galanter, Afterword: Explaining Litigation, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 347, 347-48 (1975) (highlighting how certain classes of civil parties are “repeat players” who benefit from regular interactions with the
courts, while “one-shotters” who interact with the courts on an episodic basis are disadvantaged). Compare, e.g., Markowitz, supra note 7, at 1354 (“We are concerned that we cannot
trust courts . . . to strike an optimum balance because of two types of bias: bias against
politically disfavored criminal defendants and bias in favor of criminal justice actors (prosecutors and police) who are regular collaborators with the court in the administration of
justice.”), with Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of
Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 540-41 (1992) (describing
bias against poor litigants), and Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice
Is in the Halls, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 119, 150 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982)
(describing judges’ biases against tenants and in favor of landlords).
115. Providing counsel when there is an extraordinary interest at stake could reflect a
special devotion to obtaining an accurate decision in such cases, but it might also serve to
thwart a uniquely horrendous outcome regardless of innocence or guilt. See MONROE H.
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2-3 (1975) (suggesting that the
purpose of the criminal trial is to protect individual rights, not to seek truth); Herbert L.
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1964) (describing
“guilt-defeating doctrines” of due process model).
116. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1979) (“[I]ncarceration [i]s so severe a
sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent
defendant ha[s] been offered appointed counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the
cost to the States implicit in such a rule.” (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32-33,
37, 41 (1972))).
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ests of civil litigants.117 Although this comparison has been touched
upon by other authors, this Article will inject into the discussion
fresh insights drawn from research regarding collateral consequences
of criminal and civil proceedings.118 It will suggest that this new research gives us reason to question the prioritization of criminal counsel.
A. Liberty
A criminal conviction could result in a defendant’s loss of physical
liberty or even his or her life. Scholars of constitutional law and ethics often quite reasonably presume that their readers will agree on
the significance of this loss, and they rely on it without belaboring
the point.119 Because this Article questions the prioritization of counsel for criminal defendants, and may appear to question the primacy
of the liberty interests such counsel protect, it is necessary first to
consider carefully why one might safely assume the importance of the
liberty interests at stake in a criminal trial. This brief discussion will
not attempt to do justice to the philosophical, religious, or political
treatments of life and liberty, but merely to inform the discussion
that follows with a reminder of the gravity of the subject at issue.
A person’s interest in his or her life is indeed substantial. Most
societies consider life to be sacred.120 Its loss is unique and not correctable if an error is made.121 Many prominent scholars and activists
have pushed for the complete abolition of the death penalty.122 The
Supreme Court first recognized a right to appointed counsel in a capital case, perhaps in part because of an appreciation that the stakes
for the defendant were profound.123
Because death is a very uncommon punishment, however, it has
not been the primary consideration in most discussions of the right to
counsel. Most scholars believe that the right should extend beyond

117. Economists have sought to evaluate the market value of physical liberty. See, e.g.,
David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from
the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750, 756, 769 (2011) (finding that 90
days of freedom is roughly equivalent in value to $1,000).
118. See Michael Pinard, Consequences of Criminal Convictions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457,
460 (2010).
119. See Packer, supra note 115, at 16; Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 150, 156 (David Luban
ed., 1983).
120. See Ronald Dworkin, Life Is Sacred. That’s the Easy Part., N.Y. TIMES MAG., May
16, 1993, at 36.
121. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (“[Death] is different in both
its severity and its finality.”).
122. E.g., AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN CONDITION 246-60 (2001).
123. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 46 (1932).
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capital charges.124 The infrequency of capital punishment prevents it
from explaining the need for counsel in the vast majority of cases.
The remainder of this Subpart will therefore focus on the interest
more often at stake: the loss of liberty occasioned by incarceration.
The importance of a loss of physical liberty is undeniable.125 Incarceration necessarily involves a physical intrusion and loss of privacy.126 It includes a loss of independence, autonomy, and dignity.127 It
occasions, though not a complete loss of life, a loss of some portion of
a life; it sacrifices the opportunity to choose where and how to occupy
one’s days for all the time in prison.128 Additionally, given the conditions of many prisons, exposure to physical and mental harms can
fairly be recognized as likely consequences of incarceration.129
Yet the loss of liberty provides no clear distinction between criminal and civil cases. In immigrant removal, civil commitment, and civil contempt proceedings, a loss of physical liberty is also at stake.
Hearings regarding revocation of parole or probation violations, too,
are classified as civil, though if the individual loses, she will go to
prison.130 Even the Supreme Court has recognized that the civilcriminal dichotomy is an unreliable indicator of whether liberty is at
stake.131
Setting aside the doctrinal inconsistency in the application of the
liberty rationale for the appointment of counsel, the rationale suffers
from deeper problems. As weighty as the loss of physical liberty may
be, it is not self-evident that this interest is more significant than all
other interests at risk in adversary proceedings. Missing out on years
124. Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument
From Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 818 (2004) (proposing that criminal
defense counsel should prioritize “clients who have the most at stake or are likely to gain
the greatest life benefit”).
125. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has
always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action.” (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982))). For a discussion of the special value of liberty, see Kaufman, supra note 82.
126. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 887-89 (2009).
127. See Jonathan Simon, Editorial, Mass Incarceration on Trial, 13 PUNISHMENT &
SOC’Y 251, 251 (2011).
128. See Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:
AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY 96 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1845904 (describing physical, psychological, and social destruction imposed by long-term incarceration).
129. This can include harms caused by guards, other prisoners, or the physical environment. See Dolovich, supra note 126, at 887-89 (describing that prisons pose health and
safety threats); id. at 887 n.21 (collecting literature on physical and sexual abuse of prisoners).
130. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781 (1973) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972)).
131. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (ruling that juveniles must be appointed counsel
despite civil classification of delinquency proceedings).
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of a person’s ordinary life is undeniably significant. Yet the right to
counsel attaches for crimes with a jail sentence as short as one day.132
Therefore, to justify the contrast of this absolute right with the caseby-case approach in civil matters, one must show that there is something about freedom from incarceration that is qualitatively different
and necessarily more significant than all other interests.
A large literature disputes that this is possible.133 The American
Bar Association in 2006 adopted a resolution advocating the appointment of counsel in civil matters where “basic human needs” are
at stake.134 The resolution defined basic human needs to include five
categories: shelter, sustenance, safety, health, and child custody.135 It
is difficult to deny that these needs are compelling. Can we categorically determine that physical liberty is more important than all of
them?
Let us examine more closely the example of shelter.136 A home can
be a place of safety and security, a retreat from the dangers and pry-

132. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
133. See Pollock & Greco, supra note 6, at 44-46 (collecting literature). When evaluating
removal from daily life, what kind of life it is should also be considered. See JOAN C.
TRONTO, CARING DEMOCRACY: MARKETS, EQUALITY, AND JUSTICE ix (2013) (noting that
some liberal democracies offer “mere life”). If a person’s ordinary existence includes homelessness, a night in jail might take on a different character than it does for a person with a
warm bed of his or her own. Some people deprived of shelter or healthcare would be willing
to go to prison to obtain access to these basic needs; research demonstrates that people
have committed crimes for this purpose. See Nicholas Kristof, Inside a Mental Hospital
Called Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/
opinion/sunday/inside-a-mental-hospital-called-jail.html?_r=0 (“Some people come here to
get medication . . . . They commit a crime to get in.” (quoting superintendent of women’s
jail)); KESIA REEVE WITH ELAINE BATTY, CTR. FOR REG’L ECON. & SOC. RESEARCH, THE
HIDDEN TRUTH ABOUT HOMELESSNESS (2011), available at http://www.crisis.org.uk/
data/files/publications/HiddenTruthAboutHomelessness_web.pdf (finding that 28% of
homeless persons admitted committing a minor crime in the hope of being taken into custody overnight, and 20% reported avoiding bail or committing “an imprisonable offence
with the express purpose of receiving a custodial sentence as a means of resolving their
housing problems”). But see Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 130 (2003) (“No one who knows the slightest
thing about criminal prosecution would choose it over civil litigation.”); id. at 131-35 (describing negative impact of imprisonment and arguing that “[t]he price of criminal punishment is unparalleled”).
134. ABA RES., supra note 7.
135. The ABA Resolution identifies the following five core interests: (1) shelter; (2)
sustenance, defined as income from various sources including benefits from government
agencies and wages from private employment; (3) safety; (4) access to healthcare; and (5)
child custody and parental rights. Id. at 13.
136. Compare Barton & Bibas, supra note 6, at 972 (“It is far more important to fund
appointed lawyers in serious felony cases than it is to provide them in, say, housing
court.”), with Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS. J. 699, 700-01
(2006), and Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for
Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 564 (1988).
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ing eyes of public spaces.137 Home can be, and is in the minds of
many, a place to go at the end of the day, where you know your
neighbors and they know you. Important feminist work has challenged the public-private dichotomy and revealed that, given the
prevalence of domestic violence and child abuse, home is not actually
safe for all.138 Yet home continues to be a place where people spend
years of their lives, build memories, and come to define their sense of
being.139 For many families, the home is their largest financial investment, as well as a symbol of the life they have spent working towards that investment, or one that they hope to build in the future.140
The loss of a home is a significant displacement. Evictions often
lead to homelessness,141 which means sleeping on public streets or in
homeless shelters, both of which are likely to expose persons to physical and mental harms comparable to those experienced in prison,
namely physical and sexual assault, illness, and unsanitary conditions.142 Research also demonstrates that homeless persons face particular challenges in building and maintaining social and professional networks.143
Another of the “basic human needs” identified by the American
Bar Association is parental rights.144 Of supreme importance to al137. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 978, 997
(1982) (highlighting privacy interests in the home).
138. See Jennifer Koshan, Sounds of Silence: The Public/Private Dichotomy, Violence,
and Aboriginal Woman, in CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 87, 88-94 (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997) (summarizing literature and related advocacy).
139. See Radin, supra note 137, at 991-92.
140. See TRONTO, supra note 133, at 3 (highlighting the common view of the home as
an economic asset); Radin, supra note 137, at 972, 987 n.104; Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to
Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the Enactment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 683, 712 n.126 (2011).
141. NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS,
HOMES NOT HANDCUFFS: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES
8
(2009),
available
at
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/
CrimzReport_2009.pdf.
142. BEN ROEBUCK, INST. FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME, HOMELESSNESS,
VICTIMIZATION, AND CRIME 15-17 (2008), available at http://homeless.samhsa.gov/
ResourcFiles/Homelessness,%20Victimization%20and%20Crime%20%20Knowledge%
20and%20Actionable%20Recommendations.pdf.
143. See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, EMPLOYMENT AND HOMELESSNESS 1-4
(2009), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/factsheets/Employment.pdf (describing the relationship between homelessness and employment); Julia C. Torquati & Wendy
C. Gamble, Social Resources and Psychosocial Adaptation of Homeless School Aged Children, 10 J. SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 305, 305-07 (2001).
144. Compare ABA RES., supra note 7, at 13 (recommending appointment where parental rights are at stake), with Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-31 (1981)
(denying categorical right to counsel where parental rights are at stake). Since Lassiter,
the majority of states have passed legislation providing appointed counsel whenever the
State threatens to terminate a parental status. See Abel & Rettig, supra note 12, at 252-60
(summarizing statutes).
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most any parent is the relationship with his or her child.145 A termination proceeding threatens to end a parent’s legal and experienced
relationship with the child.146 If termination occurs, the result is
permanent and irrevocable. The result can remove a fundamental
piece of the parent’s identity and deprive him or her of a lifetime of
experiences with the child.147
Shelter and custody are just two of the interests identified by the
ABA as important enough to necessitate the protection of counsel.
This Article does not adopt the ABA Resolution as the only or best
formulation of the interests that should animate the appointment of
counsel.148 Yet this formulation demonstrates that important interests are devalued when criminal counsel is prioritized over civil
counsel.
Not only does the prioritization of criminal counsel implicitly value liberty over all other interests, but, moreover, it implies a limited
definition of liberty.149 In deportation proceedings, the outcome can
deprive an immigrant of the freedom to pursue life in the United
States.150 After an eviction proceeding, one can lose access to one’s
home and be left without a private place to raise one’s family.151 To
define the deprivation of liberty as incarceration, but not eviction or
deportation, is to assume the priority this Article seeks to evaluate.
B. Collateral Consequences & Stigma
Advocates of a right to civil counsel have focused primarily on the
weight of the interests at stake in civil proceedings. This Article will
suggest that private interests are only half of the story. But first it
fleshes out the comparative analysis by highlighting private interests
that have not previously informed the discussion: collateral conse145. See generally Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a “Civil Gideon” Under the Montana
Constitution: Parental Rights as the Starting Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81 (2005); Michele R.
Forte, Note, Making the Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 28 NOVA L. REV. 193 (2003).
146. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147. See infra note 193 and sources cited therein.
148. One might argue that the language of “needs” instead of “rights” frames the appointment of counsel as charity. See Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 828 (2002) (challenging the
treatment of legal services for the poor as charity rather than rights).
149. See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781 (1987) (critiquing
anti-regulatory views under which “[l]iberty [i]s reduced to limited government”); see also
SANDEL, supra note 113, at 321 (critiquing a “voluntarist conception of freedom”). For further discussion of the limits of this definition of liberty, see infra pp. 932-33.
150. See generally Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v.
Kentucky: The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1461 (2011) (analyzing the constitutional status of deportation).
151. See Radin, supra note 137, at 991-93 (highlighting that individuals, including
residential tenants, have liberty and autonomy interests connected to their homes).
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quences and stigma. Collateral consequences of criminal convictions
have recently received increased attention.152 Explorations of the role
of defense counsel in mitigating collateral consequences offer interesting lessons for civil cases, which this Part will address. Stigma is
not generally recognized as a formal collateral consequence but is
indeed a significant consequence of criminal conviction and will
therefore be considered as well. A comparison of the stigma of criminal and civil judgments is overdue.
1. Collateral Consequences
Commentators use the term “collateral consequences” to refer to
negative civil consequences that follow a criminal conviction.153 These
include consequences for employment, housing, education, parental
rights, immigration status, and other civil rights and benefits. Collateral consequences have expanded significantly in recent decades.154
As Alexandra Natapoff has highlighted, while a misdemeanor
conviction can result in a maximum jail term of one year or less, the
collateral consequences of such a conviction can follow a person for a
lifetime.155 On the aggregate level, the collateral consequences of
misdemeanor convictions exclude vast numbers of people, disproportionately poor people of color, from civil society.156 Jenny Roberts has
suggested that “collateral consequences often overshadow the direct
penal sentences in criminal cases.”157 Given the size of the affected
population, the long duration, and the breadth of the social and economic exclusion imposed, the significance of collateral consequences
may have eclipsed that of incarceration.
Given the “scope, severity, and ubiquity”158 of collateral consequences, John King has argued that counsel should be appointed in
criminal cases regardless of whether incarceration is at stake.159
Even the Supreme Court, while not embracing a right to counsel
based on collateral consequences, has recognized the role of counsel
in advising persons facing collateral consequences. In Padilla v. Ken152. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 356-62 (2010); MARGARET COLGATE
LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE (2013).
153. See King, supra note 56, at 2 n.2.
154. See Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214-15 (2010); King, supra note 56, at 24
(describing reasons for expansion of collateral consequences).
155. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 113-16 (2012).
156. Id. at 158.
157. Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence,
and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. REV. 119, 119 (2009).
158. King, supra note 56, at 2.
159. Id. at 6.
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tucky,160 the Court ruled that misadvising a client regarding nearcertain immigration consequences of a plea constituted deficient performance of counsel.161 The question of appointment was not before
the Court, but some scholars have suggested that the decision supports extension of the right to counsel to the context of pleas.162 Notably, the function that counsel was expected to serve in that particular
plea context was to provide advice and counsel on civil collateral
consequences.
The growing recognition of the role of criminal defense counsel in
mitigating collateral consequences carries interesting implications
for the discussion of the role of civil counsel. If collateral consequences necessitate the assistance of counsel,163 the underlying logic suggests a need for counsel in civil cases too. This is for two independent
reasons.
First, if indirect consequences for civil interests trigger a need for
counsel, events directly affecting those interests must trigger the
same result. Categories of collateral consequences that have received
particular attention include employment,164 housing,165 and immigra160. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 356 (2010).
161. Id. at 371-75.
162. See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133 (2013);
Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013). The Supreme
Court has begun to recognize that today’s appointed criminal defense attorney handles the
vast majority of her cases not by presentation of a narrative at trial, but through negotiation that ends in a plea agreement. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371. This acknowledgement
carries an additional implication for the right to civil counsel. For decades, the majority of
civil litigation has ended in settlement, and a great deal of civil litigation has involved
bargaining rather than trials. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 459, 461-84 (2004) (collecting literature on the number of trials that occur in the
U.S. per year); see also Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The Bankruptcy Experience, 1
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 913, 917 (2004). The newly recognized predominance of bargaining in criminal defense underscores the increasing similarities in the roles performed by
civil and criminal counsel. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1073-75 (1984) (describing movement away from civil litigation and towards development
of negotiation and mediation skills), with Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372-75 (emphasizing that the
vast majority of criminal convictions result from negotiated pleas and that “negotiation of a
plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel”).
163. King, supra note 56, at 23 (“Counsel has an important but often overlooked role to
play in making these hidden consequences known to the defendant charged with a lowlevel crime.”); see also Natapoff, supra note 155, at 128 (“For this adversarial theory to
function there are two requirements: first, counsel must be appointed, and second, counsel
must test the government’s case.”).
164. See generally Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 410 (2001) (discussing the effects of incarceration on employment opportunities post-release).
165. See Pinard, supra note 154, at 1214 (noting that collateral consequences can include ineligibility for “government-assisted housing”).
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tion status.166 If the employment consequences of criminal convictions
deserve weight, employment interests must be weighty themselves.
Why should the employment implications of a criminal conviction
necessitate criminal defense counsel, who could protect these interests indirectly, but not civil counsel, who could pursue them directly?167
Second, as an empirical matter, criminal convictions are not the
only court decisions that routinely and predictably result in negative
consequences: civil judgments bring their own automatic consequences for participation in civil society. Take the example of housing.168 A
judgment of possession can disqualify a tenant from future housing
subsidies.169 It can also mark the individual as undesirable on a nationwide, privately-controlled “blacklist”170 that property owners use
to screen potential renters.171 Like the consequences of criminal convictions, the collateral consequences of an eviction systematically
block access to future shelter.
Sweeping still more broadly, any civil judgment will damage the
defendant’s credit,172 and a person’s credit score in the U.S. economy
is one of his or her most valuable possessions.173 A
damaged score can threaten access to employment,174 housing,175
166. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356-61.
167. Direct pursuit could include, for example, litigation regarding unemployment benefits, unpaid wages, or employment discrimination.
168. See Hous. Auth. v. Lamothe, 627 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1993) (recognizing that the
judgment had “potentially prejudicial collateral consequences” to the tenant); Mary Spector, Tenant Stories: Obstacles and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 407, 415-16 (2007) (discussing collateral consequences of evictions).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2012); 24 CFR § 982.553 (2014).
170. Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to
Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1349 n.20 (2007); see id. at 1346 (noting that
roughly 650 companies provide consolidated tenant lists).
171. Id. at 1356-64 (describing the tenant screening process and its deficiencies).
172. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS AND PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEM: A REVIEW OF HOW THE NATION’S LARGEST CREDIT BUREAUS
MANAGE CONSUMER DATA 17 (2012) [hereinafter KEY DIMENSIONS], available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-reporting-white-paper.pdf; see also
CHI CHI WU ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING 625 (8th ed. 2013)
(describing dramatic growth in the use of credit reports).
173. See Earl “Butch” Graves Jr., Your Credit Score Is Your GPA for Life, BLACK
ENTERPRISE, Oct. 2012, at 12, available at http://www.blackenterprise.com/blogs/
executive-memo/your-credit-score-is-your-gpa-life/ (“Even though education remains a vital
factor in securing a life filled with options, there’s another measure that’s equally crucial:
your credit score. Having a poor credit score can severely limit or eliminate your access to
virtually every aspect of the American dream . . . .”).
174. See generally Sharon Goott Nissim, Stopping a Vicious Cycle: The Problems with
Credit Checks in Employment and Strategies to Limit Their Use, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 45 (2010) (exploring employers’ use of credit checks to evaluate potential and
current employees).
175. See KEY DIMENSIONS, supra note 172, at 5 (noting the impact of credit report on
eligibility for mortgages and rental housing).
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education,176 transportation,177 and insurance.178 A low score can lock
a person out of the mainstream economic market.179 It is wellestablished that the use of credit scores disproportionately harms
people of color.180 A low credit score can also threaten family ties and
mating opportunities.181 Financial credentials influence custody determinations and the right to parent one’s children.182
In the criminal context, Wayne Logan has suggested that informal
collateral consequences of convictions can have equal if not greater
effects than consequences arising by formal operation of law.183 He
has highlighted informal effects of criminal convictions on housing,
employment, and mental and physical health, and he has explained
how not only the individual defendant but also third parties, including family members, suffer from collateral consequences.184 Similar
patterns can be seen in the civil context, where one loss can lead to
another, sending a person into a downward spiral.185 If the threat of
negative collateral consequences mandates a need for legal representation and protection, numerous civil matters must also require it.

176. See Credit Scores, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/creditscores.phtml (last
visited July 24, 2015).
177. Credit influences access to auto loans and auto insurance. See CHI CHI WU, NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., CREDIT SCORING AND INSURANCE: COSTING CONSUMERS BILLIONS
AND PERPETUATING THE ECONOMIC RACIAL DIVIDE 4 (2007) [hereinafter INSURANCE], available at http://www.cej-online.org/NCLC_CEJ_Insurance_Scoring_Racial_Divide_0706.pdf.
178. See WU, INSURANCE, supra note 177, at 4-8.
179. See id. at 3 (“A bad credit score is a financial ‘Scarlet Letter’ ostracizing a person
from the land of reasonably priced credit, good jobs and . . . insurance coverage.”); Shweta
Arya et al., Anatomy of the Credit Score, 95 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 175, 175 (2013) (“In
these days of easy access to information, a negative credit event . . . can haunt a
consumer . . . .”).
180. See G EOFF SMITH & SARAH DUDA, W OODSTOCK INST., BRIDGING THE GAP:
CREDIT SCORES AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN ILLINOIS COMMUNITIES OF COLOR
(2010), available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/sites/default/files/attachments/
bridgingthegapcreditscores_sept2010_smithduda.pdf.; W U, INSURANCE , supra note
177, at 12-17 (collecting literature on racial disparate impact of credit scoring sy stems); Ashlyn Aiko Nelson, Credit Scores, Race, and Residential Sorting, 29 J. P OL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 39, 40 (2010).
181. See Arya et al., supra note 179, at 175 (noting that some dating websites limit the
pool of potential partners for participants with low credit scores).
182. See Pauline Gaines, Should the Richer Parent Get Custody?, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sep. 28, 2012, 12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pauline-gaines/should-the-richerparent-_b_1905815.html.
183. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1117
(2013).
184. Id. at 1107-09.
185. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 8, at 111-12 (describing negative consequences of civil judgments, particularly for mental and physical health).
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2. Stigma
Though not a formal collateral consequence,186 stigma is indeed a
negative consequence of criminal conviction.187 Beyond economic and
social ostracism, stigma may be understood to include the shame and
guilt of moral opprobrium.188 The record of a criminal conviction has
historically received recognition as a special marker of disgrace.189 It
is a particular badge of a person deemed to have transgressed the
moral code of the community.190
Yet stigma is not unique to criminal convictions.191 Termination of
parental rights or a denial of custody constitutes a determination
that one is not a fit parent; many understand this as the ultimate
judgment of moral failure.192 A finding of civil liability for the inabil186. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 23-26 (2013).
187. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting that criminal sanctions include the “opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction”); Rutledge v. United States, 517
U.S. 292, 302 (1996) (pointing to the “societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction” (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985))); Packer, supra note 115, at
16 (“The combination of stigma and loss of liberty that is embodied in the end result of the
criminal process is viewed as being the heaviest deprivation that government can inflict on
the individual.”).
188. See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39
J. L. & ECON. 519, 521 (1996).
189. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Challenges and Implications of a Systemic Social Effect Theory, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695 (2006) (“[A]s a general rule, crimes tend to convey
an aura of reprobation not usually attributable to violations of civil duties.”); John P.
Reed & Dale Nance, Society Perpetuates the Stigma of a Conviction, FED. PROBATION, June
1972, at 27, 27 (“[T]he criminal may be deprived of some or most of his civil rights (called
‘civil disability’ and sometimes ‘civil death’). . . . The convicted offender returns to the
community sans a full status and sans his respectability. The law keeps his life in bondage
for his past misdeeds.”).
190. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (noting that even a low-level
misdemeanor “remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged”); Reed & Nance, supra note 189, at 27 (“The unintended effects of registration [as a sex offender] are to broadcast his conviction and preserve his criminal stigma.”).
191. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980) (“It is indisputable that commitment
to a mental hospital can engender adverse social consequences to the individual and that
[w]hether we label this phenomena stigma or choose to call it something else . . . we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual.”)
(alterations in original) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
192. See S. Kielty, Similarities and Differences in the Experiences of Non-Resident
Mothers and Non-Resident Fathers, 20 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 74, 86 (2006) (collecting
literature suggesting that “where mothers feel unable to fulfill the duties they associate
with motherhood . . . their moral self comes under threat as ‘good mother’ tends to be synonymous with ‘good person’ ”) (internal quotation marks omitted). One commentator described this experience of moral judgment as follows:
When a noncustodial mother [(NCM)] tells someone that her kids do not
live with her, she braces for the reaction. Perhaps it is silence. Perhaps there is
a fleeting sour expression or an abrupt end to the conversation. New friends
may back away. . . . [E]ven the best reactions are tainted by the unspoken assumption that she must have done something wrong. . . . NCMs routinely expe-
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ity to pay one’s debts can also impose shame.193 Not only does the
finding damage one’s credit and cut off avenues to the economy, but it
also imposes a public condemnation of one’s incapacity to meet one’s
responsibilities.194
Is the stigma of a criminal conviction categorically more severe
than the stigma of unemployment 195 or homelessness? 196 Empirical
research has not reached this question.197 The consequences of civil
proceedings provide an important area for further study. In the
meantime, a difference in the weight of the interests cannot be assumed.
III. IDENTITY OF ADVERSARY: THE STATE
While the private interests at stake cannot fully explain the divergent approaches to criminal and civil counsel, another argument
can be made based on the identity of the criminal defendant’s adversary: the State.198 This Part of the Article lays out the view that the
State is an adversary whose presence justifies appointment of counrience harsh judgment and the assumption that they are unfit mothers. Many
have lost friends or found new friendships cut short. Others have lost family
members or job opportunities. Still more common are the difficult interactions
with schools, sports teams, and medical offices. NCMs have been denied access
to school and medical records. And they are marginalized in interactions involving their children’s extracurricular activities.
Jackie Krasas, Mothers Without Custody: Some 2 Million Women Feel the Stigma,
VITAMINW (Mar. 23, 2012), http://vitaminw.co/society/mothers-without-custody-some-2million-women-feel-stigma.
193. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 8, at 112-13 (describing that “[s]ocial stigma
similarly attaches to the failure to pay debts”); Arya, supra note 179, at 176 (collecting
literature on the correlation between “trustworthiness” and credit score); WU, INSURANCE,
supra note 177, at 4 (describing how insurers “put forth a moral person hypothesis . . . they
argue that a person who is reckless with credit may also be reckless with driving or irresponsible about maintaining a home”) (internal punctuation omitted). See generally Brent
T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear, and the Social Management of
the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010) (suggesting that homeowners
choose not to default to avoid the shame associated with foreclosure).
194. See supra note 193 and sources cited therein.
195. See Joel F. Handler & Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipients, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1969) (“All believed that the failure to
earn a living was a sign of moral decay . . .”); see also Jennifer Sherman, Bend to Avoid
Breaking: Job Loss, Gender Norms, and Family Stability in Rural America, 56 SOC. PROBS.
599, 600 (2009) (“Job loss can have destructive effects on men’s self-esteem, with results
that range from authoritarian stances within the family, to drinking and substance abuse,
to domestic violence.”) (citations omitted).
196. See supra notes 141-43 and sources cited therein; see also Kristof, supra note 133.
197. Economists have studied the stigmatizing effects of criminal convictions, but I
know of no comparable studies in the civil context. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration
Length, Employment, and Earnings 1-3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 12003, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12003 (collecting literature on
stigmatization resulting from criminal convictions).
198. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 115 (articulating the role of criminal defense
counsel when the adversary is the State).
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sel in criminal cases. Part III.A will explain how the disproportionate
power of the State threatens to distort the adversarial process in the
absence of a counterweight to even the playing field. Part III.B will
consider whether the source of the imbalance is the mismatch between a lawyer and a pro se party but will conclude that such lawyerpro se mismatches systematically occur in cases between private parties as well. Part III.C will entertain the possibility that government
power is uniquely dangerous. It will identify a narrative that depicts
the State as a dangerous entity whose power must be checked and
will suggest that the basic reason for the prioritization of criminal
over civil counsel is a view of lawyers as professional shields against
government intrusion. Parts IV and V will argue, however, that this
perspective is mistaken, and will offer a more positive interpretation
of the lawyer’s role.
A. Imbalance of Adversaries
In a contest between the State and an unrepresented individual,
the imbalance of power between the two parties appears stark.199
Such a dynamic, if uncorrected, would threaten our notion of procedural fairness, as well as our faith in the accuracy and legitimacy of
the substantive outcome.200 Defense counsel must be installed, the
argument goes, to even the playing field.
The State has far more power and expertise than the criminal defendant to investigate and present a case.201 It has a police force to
track down witnesses and physical evidence. Its investigators and
forensic experts are trained in interviewing witnesses and analyzing
evidence. The State has the power to compel witnesses to cooperate.
Through the force of law, and with physical force, witnesses can be
made to divulge information and potentially even provide false testimony to aid the State’s position.202 These resources and dynamics
combine to support a prosecutor’s efforts to assemble and present the
strongest case for conviction.
199. See id. at 4-5.
200. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (“The purpose of the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.”); Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (“The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that
partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the
guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.”); see also SANDEL, supra note 113, at 25-54
(critiquing reliance on procedural rights and inattention to substantive outcomes); Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1060 (2013) (challenging
dependence on “the right to counsel [as] a procedural substitute for substantive underlying
accuracy concerns”).
201. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 173136 (1993).
202. See ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY 55-72
(2014) (describing pressures on witnesses).
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None of these advantages is available to a defendant. If he or she
has been arrested, the physical restraint poses a direct impediment
on the ability to investigate. Even if free, an ordinary individual has
no army of foot soldiers to conduct research. One might not know
what to do with such agents if they were available. The individual
may not appreciate which facts will be considered most relevant to a
judge, jury, or prosecutor and which would be better to omit. A layperson is unlikely to understand the rules of procedure and evidence,
let alone how best to use them in mounting a defense. One might be
unaware of legal rights one possesses or lack the experience and
training needed to recognize a violation of them. Should one intuit
that some aspect of the process is improper, one might lack the skill
to articulate and challenge the impropriety.
This inequality between the parties is particularly troubling in an
adversarial system of justice like that in the United States.203 In an
adversarial system, the development and presentation of the case is
the responsibility of the parties. The parties conduct factual investigations and legal research, and they choose how to frame the case.204
They make claims and articulate defenses that they select. They bear
responsibility for procedural arguments and evidentiary objections.
Throughout, they maintain primary responsibility for identification
and articulation of the issues that the court will address.
The judge and jury, in contrast, take a neutral and relatively passive role.205 The judge generally does not conduct fact-finding nor direct the investigations performed by the parties. The judge may limit
the evidence to be admitted or the time devoted to particular matters,
but this is in the spirit of serving as an umpire and maintaining rules
of fair play, not guiding the substance of the case. The judge may request that the parties prepare briefs on questions that require further study, but even then the court relies on the parties to bring the
material to the court’s attention. Judges may conduct legal research
beyond that which the parties provide, but courts generally rule on

203. The adversarial system generally distinguishes American courts from those of
nations that take an inquisitorial approach. For a comparison, see W. Bradley Wendel,
Lawyers as Quasi-Public Actors 7-13 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1024309 (comparing common law with civil law systems); see also DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 69-77 (1988) (suggesting that comparison reveals flaws in the American system).
204. See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 26-37, 45(a)(3) (defining the rules of discovery and granting attorneys power to issue and sign subpoenas as officers of court).
205. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 119-20 (1974).
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the arguments presented. If judges raise new issues sua sponte, they
may be criticized for straying from their position of neutrality.206
One of the basic rationales for an adversarial system of justice is
that a contest between opposing parties, before an impartial tribunal,
will allow an accurate picture of events to emerge.207 Each side has
the opportunity to test and poke holes in the theories of the other.208
The combined effort should ferret out the truth and help the decisionmaker reach the right decision.209
If the State can overwhelm the criminal defendant, however, the
defendant might not succeed in producing an effective challenge to
the State’s perspective. The jury might hear one theory that is persuasive and another that is inarticulate. Without the benefit of fullydeveloped presentations on both sides, the fact-finder could reach the
wrong conclusion.210
The potential imbalance of adversaries is a key rationale for the
appointment of counsel in criminal cases. Yet there are still two possible versions of this rationale. One version posits that the State is
likely to enjoy representation by counsel, and therefore an even playing field requires counsel for the individual on the other side. Another version suggests that there is something unique about the State as
a party such that, even beyond the mismatch between a lawyer and a
pro se party, counsel for the State’s adversaries serves a special role.
The next two Subparts will address these issues in turn.
B. Pro Se v. Lawyer
The potential for pairing a represented party with an unrepresented party is significant in the criminal justice context. The prosecutor will be an attorney; the criminal defendant will usually be a
layperson. The mismatch between a pro se party and a lawyer

206. A growing body of literature argues that judges can and should take a more active
role to protect the rights of unrepresented parties while maintaining neutrality. See Engler, supra note 2, at 46 n.110 (collecting literature supporting the active judicial role).
207. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975).
208. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 115, at 4.
209. Some point out that rules of procedure and evidence block truth from reaching the
forum. While rules based on individual rights and notions of fairness do regularly trump
the need for truth, their presence does not necessarily disprove the role of truth as a motivating factor for the design of the system. As just one example, the privilege against selfincrimination may function to exclude a confession from court, but perhaps the underlying
rationale, beyond a notion of due process, dignity, or the potential burden, is a concern
about coerced confessions by innocent parties. See id. at 3-4 (describing truth as a basic
value the adversary system is designed to serve but also identifying “higher values” that
may occasionally supplant the search for truth).
210. The unjust outcome might merit special concern given the high value of the potential loss for the defendant. See supra Part II (analyzing the significance of the interests at
stake).
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threatens the functionality and legitimacy of the legal process and its
results.
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that the routine, systemic pairing of pro se parties against lawyers is not a threat unique to criminal litigation between private parties and government actors. Broad
categories of civil litigation suffer from the same dynamic. Consumers and debtors routinely appear pro se against represented adversaries.211 Studies of housing court show that roughly ten percent of
tenants are represented while roughly ninety percent of landlords are
represented.212 The vast majority of these cases involve direct and
predictable mismatches.213
Such mismatches exacerbate other asymmetries in the litigation
process. As Marc Galanter has demonstrated, certain categories of
private actors, because of their economic position and the subject
matter of the lawsuits in which they are involved, are “repeat players” in the courts; repeat players enjoy a variety of advantages and
are generally more likely to be represented by sophisticated counsel.214 For example, large employers, product manufacturers, and insurance companies are repeat players. Such repeat players hire attorneys as general counsel or retain outside counsel on a continuing
basis.215 In contrast, most natural persons are not repeat players.
Most natural persons retain counsel, if at all, on a “one-shot” basis
when faced with particular litigation. Most natural persons cannot
afford to retain counsel and, in civil matters, often forgo their claims

211. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639, 681 (1981) (“In the vast majority of transactions in every consumer sales or loan
contract . . . one party is unrepresented.”); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line:
The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 79, 118 (1997) (describing the mismatch between represented creditors and
unrepresented debtors).
212. COMTY. TRAINING & RES. CTR. & CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUS. COURT, INC.,
HOUSING COURT, EVICTIONS AND HOMELESSNESS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL iv (1993), available at http://cwtfhc.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdf/donaldson.pdf.
213. See id.
214. See Galanter supra note 205, at 97-100.
215. See Galanter supra note 114, at 361 (“Legal professionals in the United States can
be roughly dichotomized into those who service OSs [“one-shotters”] on an episodic basis
and those who serve RPs [“repeat-players”] on a continuing basis.”). Notably, repeat players not only shape the common law that will govern their actions but also benefit from
economies of scale in retaining representation. Id. at 361-62.
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or appear pro se, mostly as defendants.216 Repeat players routinely
fare better than “one-shotters” in courts.217
One-shotters and repeat players intersect on a regular basis as
part of daily life. For example, intersections occur between: tenants
and landlords; employees and employers; and consumers and product
manufacturers. Disputes between such parties arise in the ordinary
course of dealing, and such disputes end up in court with some regularity.218 As a result, the occurrence of an unrepresented one-shotter
facing off against a represented repeat player is common.219
The unrepresented individual facing a represented private party
in a civil matter will be stuck in a layperson-versus-lawyer dynamic
like that of an unrepresented criminal defendant facing a prosecutor.
In the civil context, such dynamics systemically recreate the imbalance of adversaries that the appointment of counsel in the criminal
context sought to avoid. If, in the interest of a functional, truthseeking, legitimate adversary system, legal representation for one
party necessitates representation for the other, it is unclear why this
logic should not apply in civil matters between private parties.
If the mismatch between represented parties and unrepresented
parties is not unique to the criminal context, this leaves unanswered
the question of what makes criminal defense counsel especially important. The next Subpart will explore the view that the State is a
uniquely dangerous adversary whose power must be checked by
counsel.
C. Danger of State Power
Scholars have asserted that the enormity and uniqueness of the
power of the State distinguish criminal defense from all other
spheres of practice. As William Simon has observed, even ethicists
who question the ideal of lawyers as neutral, zealous partisans220

216. See David C. Vladeck, In re Arons: The Plight of the “Unrich” in Obtaining Legal
Services, in LEGAL ETHICS STORIES 255, 261, 284-86 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban
eds., 2006).
217. See Galanter, supra note 114, at 360-61 (advantages for repeat players include
specialized expertise, economies of scale, bargaining credibility, and ability to play for rules
instead of individual results).
218. See Galanter, supra note 205, at 97.
219. See id.
220. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 62-63; William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36-37 (1978); cf. William
H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (arguing that
lawyers should have ethical discretion to consider whether assisting a client would further
justice).
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carve out an exception for criminal defense attorneys on the theory
that the zeal of these lawyers carries a special purpose.221
Part of the value placed on the role of counsel in criminal cases
depends on the idea that government power is intrinsically dangerous and special steps must be taken to protect against the possibility
of tyranny.222 David Luban has summarized the reasoning as follows:
We want to handicap the state in its power even legitimately to
punish us, for we believe as a matter of political theory and historical experience that if the state is not handicapped or restrained ex
ante, our political and civil liberties are jeopardized. Power-holders
are inevitably tempted to abuse the criminal justice system to persecute political opponents, and overzealous police will trample civil
liberties in the name of crime prevention and order. 223

Theorists have argued that, even beyond the search for truth, the
adversary system of justice serves to protect individual dignity.224
Criminal defense counsel serves not simply to even the playing field
to help the court reach the right substantive outcome but also to protect the integrity of the adversary system.225 Without criminal de221. See William H. Simon, Commentary, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1703, 1703-04 (1993); see also LUBAN, supra note 202, at 58-66; Deborah L. Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 605 (1985); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 12 (1975).
222. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 116, 142 n.51 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY (1988)) (describing the importance of countering states’ power for tyranny); Griffiths, supra note 13, at 363-64 (citing HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION (1968)).
223. LUBAN, supra note 203, at 60. Herbert Packer offers another formulation of this
perspective:
[Criminal] processes . . . are in themselves coercive, restricting, and demeaning. Power is always subject to abuse, sometimes subtle, other times, as in
the criminal process, open and ugly. Precisely because of its potency in subjecting the individual to the coercive power of the state, the criminal process must,
on this model, be subjected to controls and safeguards that prevent it from operating with maximal efficiency. According to this ideology, maximal efficiency
means maximal tyranny. And, while no one would assert that minimal efficiency means minimal tyranny, the proponents of the Due Process Model would accept with considerable equanimity a substantial diminution in the efficiency
with which the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official
oppression of the individual.
Packer, supra note 115, at 16.
224. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 115, at 3-4 (describing human dignity as among
the “higher values” to which even truth-seeking may be subordinated).
225. Id. at 24 (“[Z]ealous and effective advocacy is essential to the adversary
system, . . . a precious safeguard that any one of us may have occasion to call upon if we
should come to need our own champion against a hostile world.”); Abbe Smith, Too Much
Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathetic, Heroic
Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1208-11 (2004) (“Defenders uphold the political philosophy underlying the American system of justice and safeguard the dignity of each
member of society no matter how low he or she has fallen.”).
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fense counsel to challenge it, the State might imprison and kill citizens arbitrarily.226 The danger of allowing the State to go toe to toe
with an unrepresented defendant is that the process would be subject
to the government’s abuse of power, and the people’s rights before,
during, and after would be trampled.227 Particularly given that the
State has the special power to exert legitimized force, defense counsel
is needed to obstruct the application of that force.228
Of course it must be recognized that the State’s power as an adversary is not limited to criminal prosecution. Termination of parental rights, eviction from public housing, and restriction of social security income provide examples of proceedings that pit an unrepresented individual against the State. Criminal defense is not the only form
of litigation through which people challenge the power of the State.
Arguably, affirmative civil rights litigation presents more direct challenges to government power than does criminal defense.229 In civil
litigation regarding police brutality, substandard prison conditions,
and many other constitutional and statutory claims, the State is a
party, and the aim of counsel for the individual is indistinguishable
from that of many criminal defense attorneys: to “police the police, to
audit the government, [and] . . . fight for fairness.”230 The criminal
case is not unique in presenting a scenario whereby a potentially
vulnerable individual fights the State over deeply important interests
and counsel for that individual serves to check the State’s power.
Moreover, the depiction of the State as a massive behemoth is in
some cases more mythical than real. Some government coffers are
relatively strained.231 In white collar criminal defense, the defendant,
rather than the prosecutor, could have the larger arsenal at his or
her disposal.232 Securities litigation is just one field in which private
actors’ litigation budgets dwarf that of the government agency
charged with enforcement.233 While the cases of wealthy private defendants do not involve appointment of counsel, they nonetheless il226. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 60; Packer, supra note 115, at 16.
227. See Packer, supra note 115, at 14.
228. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 62.
229. On the flip side, in many cases the State protects civil rights by serving as the
prosecutor, such as when the Department of Justice or the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission initiates proceedings.
230. Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of
People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 957 n.158 (2000) (citation omitted); see Andrew J. Mathern, Note, Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits and Civil Gideon: A Solution to Disproportionate Police Force?, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 353 (2012).
231. See Rhode, supra note 221, at 607.
232. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 65; Rhode, supra note 221, at 607.
233. See James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall St. Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/
budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-its-effectiveness.html?_r=0.
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lustrate the point that imbalances of power do not categorically favor
the State.
Relatedly, inequality between adversaries is not restricted to cases
in which the State is one of the parties. As discussed above in Part
III.B, in particular categories of litigation between private parties,
one side is routinely pro se while the other is routinely represented
by counsel, and these mismatches exacerbate other asymmetries in
the litigation process. The prioritization of criminal over civil counsel
rests on a perceived need to counterbalance State power, but, as the
following Part will argue, government power is not the only form of
power that must be restrained. Private actors wield substantial power over the lives of ordinary people, and civil lawyers play a vital role
in checking the limits of that power as well.
IV. PRIVATE POWER
Individuals often experience stark imbalances of power in their
interactions with private actors. Private actors control access to the
resources essential for life234—such as food, shelter, and medicine235—
and those essential for participation in democratic society—
information,236 communication,237 and, increasingly, physical safety.238
The private actors who control this access also exercise disproportionate power in the litigation process where that access can be contested.239 Part IV.A will highlight the potential dangers of private
power. Part IV.B will then suggest that, beyond its position as prosecutor, the State can and does serve a vital function as a regulator of
private power. Part V will turn to the role of lawyers as professional
enforcers of such regulation.
A. Danger of Private Power
A sharp difference in resources can occur between two private parties, and empirical evidence demonstrates that such inequality in fact
routinely occurs in systematic and predictable ways.240 In custody
disputes between men and women, the former tend to be wealthier,
234. See Metzger, supra note 11, at 1377-94, 1396.
235. See id. (describing private control over welfare, Medicare, Medicaid, and care for
prisoners).
236. See Fiss, supra note 149, at 787-90 (highlighting the power of corporate media to
shape public debate).
237. Id.
238. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE. L.J. 437
(2005); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004); David A. Sklansky, The Private
Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999).
239. See Galanter, supra note 114, at 347-48; Galanter, supra note 205, at 95-104.
240. See Galanter, supra note 205, at 97.
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and this influences the gathering of evidence and ultimate outcomes.241 In employment disputes, where the discovery process can
require scouring extensive records and conducting complex depositions, employers regularly outspend their adversaries, causing workers to settle for relatively small sums or not to raise claims in the
first place.242
To be sure, there are cases where private parties are evenly
matched. The mismatch is not certain to occur in either the privateprivate or the private-government dynamic. But there are certain
social relationships where the mismatch is more likely than not, and
these relationships do occur with regularity and predictability in the
private sector.243
Private parties with power can also be arbitrary or abusive and
can use their power to threaten or cajole.244 A supervisor at work,
with control over a subordinate’s duties, hours, pay, and job security,
can make the subordinate’s “life a living hell.”245 Landlords, too, enjoy
power over their tenants’ lives,246 and abuse of that power occurs.247
241. See Gaines, supra note 182; Martha A. Field, Surrogate Motherhood, in
PARENTHOOD IN MODERN SOCIETY: LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 223, 230 (John Eekelaar & Petar Sarcevic eds., 1993); Gender Bias Study of the
Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 764 (1990) (“Family law experts
believe that women are unrepresented more often than men and that the outcomes they
obtain suffer as a result.”); see also Richard L. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession: Can
Redistributing Lawyers’ Services Achieve Social Justice?, 1 L. & POL’Y Q. 5, 14 (1979) (arguing that most litigation involving poor people cannot redistribute advantages “except, significantly, between men and women”).
242. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 563 (2001).
243. See Galanter, supra note 205, at 114.
244. See Metzger, supra note 11, at 1396.
245. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2460 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting Whitten v. Fred’s Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See id. at 2456-57 (describing how power imbalance keeps an employee
captive during a supervisor’s harassment); id. at 2457-60 (providing examples of supervisors abusing their power to alter conditions of the workplace).
246. See Kleysteuber, supra note 170, at 1349 (describing tenant blacklist abuse
whereby tenant’s future ability to rent is damaged permanently based on landlord’s allegation alone). The potential for abuse is exemplified in the following threatening letter sent
by a landlord to a tenant:
[W]e now subscribe to a service that records all filings on [eviction] actions. As
this service is used by landlords, it will be impossible, in the future, to rent an
apartment if you have been served a legal action. We are advising you of this,
as the failure to pay your rent on time[] will result in your name being placed
in the file, and you will be unable to secure any apartment in the future.
Id. (quoting Robert W. Benson & Raymond A. Biering, Tenant Reports as an Invasion of
Privacy: A Legislative Proposal, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 301, 301 (1979)).
247. See, e.g., Theresa Keeley, Landlord Sexual Assault and Rape of Tenants: Survey
Findings and Advocacy Approaches, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 441,
442-43 (2006) (collecting empirical studies of sexual abuse by landlords); Introductory Outline on Sexual Harassment in Housing, NAT’L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, http://nhlp.org/node/436
(last visited July 24, 2015) (“Due to the ever-growing demand for decent, affordable hous-
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In recent decades, a large scholarly literature has documented the
expanded privatization of public services.248 As is common knowledge,
private entities control access to electricity,249 water,250 and the Internet.251 Private entities also run prison facilities,252 police forces,253 and
national security operations.254 David Sklansky has aptly described
the ubiquity of private forces:
Uniformed private officers guard and patrol office buildings, factories, warehouses, schools, sports facilities, concert halls, train stations, airports, shipyards, shopping centers, parks, government facilities—and, increasingly, residential neighborhoods. On any given day, many Americans are already far more likely to encounter a
security guard than a police officer . . . .
....
. . . [G]overnment agencies are hiring private security personnel
to guard and patrol government buildings, housing projects, and
public parks and facilities, and a small but growing number of local governments have begun to experiment with broader use of
private police.255

As private entities increasingly take over common public functions,
their power over ordinary people grows.

ing, landlords hold increased power over whom they rent to and under what circumstances.
As a result of this power imbalance, many tenants are subjected to sexual harassment by
housing providers and their agents.”).
248. See Metzger, supra note 11, at 1371-73 (highlighting the “new reality of privatized
government” and collecting related literature).
249. Cf. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (ruling that utility services are “not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State”).
250. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States: Human Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 785, 791-93 (2009) (describing the trend of privatizing water).
251. See Jim Dwyer, For Those in the Digital Dark, Enlightenment is Borrowed
from the Library, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, at A17, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/for-those-in-the-digital-dark-enlightenmentis-borrowed-from-the-library-.html?_r=0 (“For most of the city, two companies, Time Warner and Verizon, provide broadband access, at an annual cost of close to $1,000 per home.
For many houses, that means no access at all.”); see also Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1298-1306 (1998) (describing the development of private trademark rights with respect to domain names).
252. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2002).
253. See generally Sklansky, supra note 239 (describing the private security industry).
254. See Jonathan Fahey & Adam Goldman, NSA Leak Highlights Key Role
of Private Contractors, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2013, 11:00 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/10/nsa-leak-contractors_n_3418876.html; see also
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 992-93 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (describing wiretapping by AT&T Corporation).
255. Sklansky, supra note 238, at 1175-77 (footnote omitted).

2015]

CRIMINAL OVER CIVIL COUNSEL

927

Given the scope of private control and potential for private abuses
of power, it is unclear whether the presence of a government adversary should be the indicator of a need for counsel. For many people,
the influence that private parties exert over their lives is as ubiquitous and significant as that exerted by the State. Relatedly, where
there are imbalances between ordinary people and the private actors
that control vital resources, the role of the State is not necessarily as
the adversary of the people but may be as their protector. In these
contexts, the lawyer might serve not to thwart the State but to assist it.
B. The State as Regulator of Private Power
If we tend to discount the danger of private power, it may be because we focus so intently on the State as the danger. The dangers of
State power inform the very structure of the U.S. government’s design.256 Yet the State is not only a danger. In the natural world and
the market, power inequalities exist between private parties, and one
role of the State is to protect the less powerful. The design of our government also reflects this protective purpose.257
A core function of government is to provide collectively that which
individuals cannot obtain on their own.258 This includes creating and
enforcing rules of the road for interactions between private parties.
While government agents must be checked to prevent abuse of power,
they must also be strong enough to check private actors from abusing
one another.259
As legislator, adjudicator, and enforcer, the State can support and
limit the conduct of private parties to equalize power imbalances that
would exist in the natural world.260 The State can prevent private
parties from using their physical and economic power in ways that
could lead to unjust harm or chaos. The State can also offer fora for
the peaceful and just resolution of disputes.261
256. See Griffiths, supra note 13, at 380-81.
257. See Fiss, supra note 149, at 788 (“The purpose of the state is not to supplant the
market (as it would under a socialist theory), nor to perfect the market (as it would under a
theory of market failure), but rather to supplement it.”).
258. See MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE 8-12 (2010).
259. See Fiss, supra note 149, at 781-83 (describing efforts to limit state power and
advocating for “the necessity of an activist state”).
260. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 7 (2008).
261. The role of the State permeates all civil and criminal proceedings, from creating
and maintaining the governing laws to adjudicating and enforcing them. In the criminal
proceeding, the State serves as prosecutor and judge, but even in cases between two private parties, the State plays a role. As just one example, if a landlord brings a successful
eviction proceeding against a tenant, a judge issues the judgment of possession, and it is
the marshal or sheriff, not the landlord, who will forcibly remove the tenant if she attempts
to remain on the premises after that judgment. Although the state action doctrine has
sought to distinguish between levels of state involvement, scholars have demonstrated the
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Governmental actors routinely mediate power imbalances between private parties through the passage of legislation. The Fair
Labor Standards Act prevents employers from pressuring employees
to accept pay rates below a set minimum.262 Consumer protection
laws prevent sellers from engaging in fraud or deception.263 Environmental statutes protect the public’s supply of clean water by restricting the actions of private actors who would pollute it.264 Housing
statutes prevent landlords from arbitrarily ejecting tenants from
their homes.265 Indeed, legislation limits private actors’ imposition of
collateral consequences after criminal convictions266 and civil judgments.267 It affirmatively promotes access to employment and housing by prohibiting discrimination against protected classes268 and
against persons with criminal records269 or eviction histories.270
The State is more than a criminal prosecutor, and the justice system includes more than the criminal justice system. Lawyers have a
role not only in checking State power, but also in helping people to
obtain State support and helping to enforce the State’s regulation of
power inequalities between private parties.

inherent difficulty with resting rights on such a project. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505-07 (1985) (arguing that the state action requirement is incoherent and undesirable and should be abandoned); Metzger, supra note
11, at 1371-73 n.6-10 (collecting literature on the state action doctrine).
262. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
263. See generally COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, OTHER
CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS AND REGULATIONS (2009), available at http://www.occ.gov/
publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/other.pdf, for a summary of federal consumer protection laws.
264. See generally DAVID M. BEARDEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS: SUMMARIES OF MAJOR STATUTES ADMINISTERED BY THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL30798.pdf, for a summary of federal environmental laws.
265. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL. PROP. ACTS. LAW § 853 (McKinney 2014) (providing right of
action to challenge forcible or unlawful exclusion from property).
266. See King, supra note 56, at 47 n.273 (listing state legislation prohibiting employment discrimination against persons with criminal convictions).
267. E.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-807 to -811 (2014) (providing protections against
tenant blacklisting); see Proposed State Legislation Would Safeguard Tenants’ Rights in
Foreclosure, 40 HOUSING L. BULL. 131, 134 (2010) (listing state legislation that requires
sealing of eviction records).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (prohibiting housing discrimination).
269. See King, supra note 56, at 47 n.273.
270. § 3604.
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V. ROLE OF LAWYER
How well the State regulates power imbalances between private
parties depends in part on the distribution of lawyers.271 Many categories of civil laws are underenforced because of the unavailability of
counsel to represent the individuals with claims.272 At the same time,
other categories are overenforced because, routinely, plaintiffs retain
counsel while defendants cannot.273 The imbalance in representation
has the potential to stymie the protection of individual rights and
also to thwart the rule of law.274 Part V will explore the roles that
counsel can serve to protect the rule of law and to promote their clients’ equal participation in and access to the fruits of civil society.
A. Protector of Rule of Law and Check on Use of Force
The classic rationale for the appointment of criminal defense
counsel is that her participation is essential to protect procedural and
substantive legal rights against governmental overreach or abuse.275
The U.S. Constitution supplies the criminal defendant with a handful
of protections from the State, but she needs a lawyer to bring them to
life.276 She cannot invoke her rights without legal assistance. Lawyers
serve to ensure that clients’ rights are protected and the rule of law is
maintained. 277

271. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive PublicInterest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 213 (2003) (arguing that hobbling advocates undermines the legitimacy of the adversary system).
272. See Vladeck, supra note 216, at 284-86.
273. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
274. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 8, at 113; Fiss, supra note 164, at 1085;
Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
803, 830-32 (2009); see also Complaint at 1, People v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., No.
BC508466, 2013 WL 1915821 (L.A. Cnty., Cal. Super. Ct. May 9, 2013) (describing “massive debt collection mill” whereby JPMorgan “flooded . . . courts with collection lawsuits
against defaulted credit card borrowers based on patently insufficient evidence—betting
that borrowers would lack the resources or legal sophistication to call Defendants’ bluff”),
available at http://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/Complaint_0.pdf?;
Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: RoboSigning and Lack of Proof in Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 259, 262 (2011) (describing widespread consumer abuse resulting from the “debt buyer litigation
model . . . characterized by a sophisticated business represented by a skilled lawyer suing
an unsophisticated, unrepresented consumer in which no formal rules of evidence are applied, and rank hearsay is rampant”).
275. See Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1114 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 542 (1977) (“[P]rofessional critics are necessary to check government
misconduct.”).
276. See Kaley, 134 S. Ct. at 1107 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 653-54
(1984)).
277. See Weissman, supra note 148, at 743-49 (describing the role of lawyers in protecting the rule of law).
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The violation of an individual’s rights threatens the stability of
democratic society more broadly. If the process is not maintained in
one case, deterrence of bad conduct may be diminished. A lawyer not
only protects the client from having improperly seized evidence used
at trial but also protects the citizenry from a world in which improper
seizures are commonplace. The recognized need for counsel reflects a
suspicion that the State would abuse its power and violate the rights
of the people if not for vigilant guardians to protect them.278 The lawyer’s obligation is to defend the integrity of the process.279 By safeguarding the safeguards, the lawyer serves to ensure a society governed by the rule of law rather than the rule of might.
The lawyer also protects the client’s substantive rights. She protects the otherwise vulnerable client from a harsh outcome.280 She
wards off the State’s use of force, preventing, mitigating, or at least
delaying it.281 A major impetus for the structure of the adversarial
trial, and the role of the criminal defense lawyer within it, is to create a barrier between the individual and the coercive force of the
State.282 The lawyer serves not only as the guarantor of fair play but,
more fundamentally, as the buffer between the client and the State’s
acts of force.283
If criminal defense lawyers safeguard rights and the rule of law,284
lawyers in the civil context serve a comparable function. Lawyers
representing civil defendants ensure that substantive and procedural
laws are maintained and protect civil defendants against plaintiffs
278. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
279. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 22
(2002).
280. Note the nexus between the private interests at stake and the identity of the adversary. The criminal defense lawyer serves to keep the State from imposing imprisonment
or death. See supra Part II.A.
281. See LUBAN, supra note 203, at 62 (describing the criminal adversarial process and
the lawyer’s role within it as creating an obstacle course for the State); see also Packer,
supra note 115, at 13 (“If the Crime Control Model resembles an assembly line, the Due
Process Model looks very much like an obstacle course. Each of its successive stages is designed to present formidable impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the
process.”).
282. See Griffiths, supra note 13, at 387 (“The defendant’s interest is only to resist the
imposition on himself of any State power.”).
283. See Natapoff, supra note 155, at 1352 (“[T]he focus on punishment and cost omits
other core values served by criminal adjudication—the standard ones being legality, evidentiary accuracy, and fair process.”).
284. Some scholars have challenged the portrait of lawyers safeguarding rights and the
rule of law. See, e.g., Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 489-94 (2007). Particularly given the predominance of pleas rather than trials, this portrait may be viewed as romantic more than real. See Natapoff,
supra note 201, at 1066-70. However, others have responded that, particularly in a climate
of bargains influenced more by the power of the adversary than the shadow of the law, the
presence of counsel is as critical as ever for combatting that power. See Bowers, supra note
162, at 1142-44, 1150.
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who would use the public courts to impose their will. For example,
the tenant’s attorney in an eviction case checks whether the basis for
the proceeding is meritorious, as opposed to a careless error, an act of
retaliation, or mere exertion of will. The lawyer defends by using the
tools at his or her disposal to check the system.
In both criminal and civil contexts, if the civil plaintiff or criminal
prosecutor short-circuits the process, the defense lawyer can challenge the violation of law. If police officers seize evidence without a
warrant or exception, criminal defense counsel can move to have the
evidence excluded. If a landlord ejects a tenant from a home without
a judgment of possession, the tenant’s lawyer can challenge this extralegal use of force.
Lawyers check not only physical but also economic power. Economic power plays a significant role in ordinary life,285 and civil lawyers have an important role to play in protecting against its unbridled application. Numerous laws serve to check the abuse of economic power,286 and such laws are not self-enforcing: they tend to be complex and require lawyers’ assistance.287 Lawyers can counterbalance
inequalities of power between private actors. They can prevent private actors with greater economic power from abusing those with
less. In so doing, they not only maintain the rule of law but also protect the dignity of the economically weaker members of society.288
B. Lawyering for Justice Beyond the Civil-Criminal Divide
The communities of persons unable to afford counsel in civil and
criminal proceedings overlap substantially. Both are disproportionately poor people of color, and their criminal justice and civil justice
needs are interrelated.289 Lawyers have a role to play in supporting
285. See supra notes 239-44, 248-51 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Part IV.
287. It is for this reason that many of the laws protecting against private abuses of
power specifically provide for the loser to pay attorneys’ fees when plaintiffs prevail. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012); S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910 (1976) (“[I]f those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are
not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it
costs them to vindicate these rights in court.”); see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money
Got to Do with It? Public Interest Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 465-71,
488-92 (2014) (arguing that litigation pursuant to fee-shifting statutes is a form of public
interest lawyering).
288. See FREEDMAN, supra note 115, at 24 (“[Z]ealous and effective advocacy is essential to the adversary system, . . . a precious safeguard that any one of us may have occasion
to call upon if we should come to need our own champion against a hostile world.”). For a
common portrait of criminal defense attorneys protecting individual dignity, see also Smith
supra note 225, at 1210 (“Defenders uphold the political philosophy underlying the American system of justice and safeguard the dignity of each member of society no matter how
low he or she has fallen.”).
289. The key difference between the populations may be one of gender: most civil legal
services clients are female, while most clients of appointed criminal defense counsel are
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their clients’ equal participation in, and access to the resources of,
civil society. The prioritization of criminal over civil counsel exaggerates the divide between the functions these lawyers serve and neglects the significance of accessing economic and political resources
for both client populations. Further, it falsely suggests that the most
valuable work of a lawyer is to ward off the intrusion of regulation,
rather than to support its robust and equal application.290
In the criminal case, the best outcome from the perspective of the
individual appears, at least at first blush, to be freedom from State
interference.291 In the civil case, sometimes the best outcome may be
framed as freedom from State interference, but other times it can be
access to basic economic necessities, freedom from discrimination, or
male. Compare LEGAL SERVS. CORP., LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BY THE NUMBERS: THE
DATA UNDERLYING LEGAL AID PROGRAMS 25 (2013), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/
default/files/LSC/LSC2013BTN.pdf (71.2% of clients of civil legal aid offices supported by
Legal Services Corporation were female); Bezdek, supra note 114, at 535, 540 nn.21-22
(observing that 71% of the defendant tenants in Baltimore were female and 87% were
black, while 13% were white); see also Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants:
Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 393 (1995) (finding
that in New Haven, Connecticut, nearly 80% of the defendant tenants in eviction cases
were women); Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction
Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 534 (1991) (asserting that in
New York, two-thirds of defendant tenants in the housing court are single women), with
THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS
IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 31 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf (82.4% of felony defendants were male in 75 of the largest population counties in the U.S.); David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw:
Using Random Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145,
1162 (2007) (81% of clients of public defender’s office were male). While beyond the scope of
this Article, the gender gap in treatment of the two populations provides yet another reason to interrogate more carefully the valuation of criminal over civil counsel. See LISA
ADDARIO, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN & THE LAW, GETTING A FOOT IN THE DOOR: WOMEN, CIVIL
LEGAL AID AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1998), available at http://docs.escrnet.org/usr_doc/Lisa_Addario_-_footinthedoor_e.pdf; Mary Jane Mossman, Gender Equality
and Legal Aid Services: A Research Agenda for Institutional Change, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 30,
46 (1993) (highlighting gender inequality in prioritizing criminal defense over civil representation). Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 55 (2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2013-APP.pdf (annual federal
funding for Federal Defenders Services was approximately $1,063,517,000), with id. at
1355 (annual federal funding for indigent civil legal services was approximately
$402,000,000).
290. See ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAW: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF
PROFESSIONALISM 112 (2013) (“If a lawyer is an admirable person and in an admirable
profession, then it cannot possibly be by virtue of his or her association with lawmakers; it
must rather be by virtue of having helped someone victimized by lawmakers ward off the
effect of silly, misguided, overly invasive, stupidly or wrongly misapplied law.”); id. at 111
(describing a portrait of legislation as “an unwarranted bureaucratic intrusion on what
would otherwise be either a ruggedly individualistic or a bucolic communitarian
existence”).
291. See Packer, supra note 115, at 2-3. But see generally Nicole Martorano Van Cleve,
Reinterpreting the Zealous Advocate: Multiple Intermediate Roles of the Criminal Defense
Attorney, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 293 (Leslie C.
Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012) (describing other goals of zealous advocacy).
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the security of various other interests. In the criminal proceeding, the
goal is to limit the State’s use of force; in the civil proceeding, sometimes it may also be to limit such force, but other times it can be to
utilize the power of the law to protect against other forms of extralegal force. When we assume that the outcomes at stake in the criminal
proceeding are necessarily weightier, we suggest that what we most
want from the State is to be left alone. The right to be left alone, this
perspective tells us, is necessarily more valuable and worthy of protection than any other right.292
The prioritization of the right to be left alone has limits. As scholars writing in the area of criminal justice have begun to highlight,
formal procedural justice in the courtroom may not be what criminal
defendants need most. Criminal defendants function in a broader social context. A fair and equal justice system requires not only representation in individual proceedings but also institutional work on
social welfare policies.293 The lawyer may be most effective when
working in these other arenas.294
The role of the lawyer, both criminal and civil, is not only to protect the individual from intrusions by the State but also to obtain
State support. This can take the form of helping people stay out of
the criminal justice system or advocating for them when they reenter civil society. It might mean pursuing housing subsidies, educational programs, or job training, while also lobbying for statutes to
prohibit employers, landlords, and lenders from discriminating
against persons with convictions. Just as traditional criminal defense
lawyering seeks to equalize power, so do these kinds of activities:
they seek to equalize economic access and participation in civic life.
In many cases, such lawyering is at least as important as representation in criminal proceedings. The availability of legal counsel to
improve access to housing and employment could ultimately have a
larger impact on criminal defendants, individually and in the aggregate—including both actual defendants and potential defendants—
than counsel in criminal proceedings. Scholars have posited that affirmative legal services might more fundamentally change the struc-

292. Yet, even in the criminal context, the logic of this prioritization breaks down. The
right to be left alone requires assistance for its enforcement. In criminal defense, the right
to be left alone depends on the safeguards of the rule of law, which, in turn, depend on the
availability of counsel. Before the State leaves the individual alone, the State must provide
her with counsel to support her rights. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the PleaBargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117,
1148 (2011).
293. See Natapoff, supra note 200, at 1075-76.
294. See Robin Steinberg, Heeding Gideon’s Call in the Twenty-First Century: Holistic
Defense and the New Public Defense Paradigm, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 961, 962-63, 97577, 989-1000 (2013).
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ture of society than defensive representation,295 and today this may
be increasingly the case.296
C. Affirmative Lawyering
Advocates of a right to civil counsel have achieved important victories in areas of defensive lawyering, but increasing the availability
of affirmative lawyering ought also to be a priority. Checking economic abuse often involves affirmative litigation.297 In the void left by
the Supreme Court, a healthy number of state and local governments
have stepped in to provide counsel in civil proceedings,298 but most
have focused on counsel for civil defendants. This focus recognizes
that the State ought not to drag people into court without providing
guidance in the process. Yet the emphasis on defensive lawyering
discounts the importance of lawyers’ role in affirmatively enforcing
limits on the abuse of power. The appointment of counsel to represent
civil defendants will not be sufficient to check the power of private
actors. Beyond reactive lawyering, counsel must protect people
through proactive efforts.
Admittedly, defining the limit for appointment of counsel might be
more complex if the right extended beyond named defendants to
plaintiffs and potential plaintiffs, but at least one initial step is
available. A modest method of increasing the availability of counsel
in affirmative litigation would be to shore up already-existing legislation that, in certain categories of cases, approves payment of prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys, using funds from losing defendants. In contrast to the general rule that each party pays the costs of hiring civil
counsel,299 Congress has passed more than 150 laws authorizing the
shifting of fee payments from defendants to prevailing plaintiffs in a
defined category of cases—including unpaid wages, housing discrimination, consumers’ rights, and environmental protections, among

295. See Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived Justice for Individuals, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 913, 930 (2009); see also Robert Lefcourt, Lawyers for the Poor
Can’t Win, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE 123, 130, 134 (1971) (arguing that subsidized defense lawyers legitimize the enforcement of poor people’s obligations).
296. See supra notes 152-62, 184-85 and accompanying text (highlighting the increasing importance of collateral consequences); see also supra notes 248-55 (highlighting increasing private control over delivery of previously public services).
297. See Blasi, supra note 295 (framing access to justice to include affirmative litigation and non-litigation activities). Affirmative representation might do more than defensive
representation to shift, or at least check the abuse of, power. See Lefcourt, supra note 295.
298. See supra note 13.
299. See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 2119, 2130-37 (2000) (highlighting “unaided access” as a premise of the U.S. civil
justice system).
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others.300 These statutes support the work of counsel who represent
persons unable to pay the lawyers themselves. Fee-shifting statutes
remain technically in force today, but the Supreme Court has sharply
narrowed their effects, by approving tactics that avoid defendants’
obligation to cover the costs of plaintiffs’ counsel.301 Relatively
straightforward legislation could counteract the Court’s decisions and
strengthen the existing mechanisms for payment of plaintiffs’ counsel.302
Although enhanced fee-shifting legislation is not a complete solution to expanding the availability of counsel, this approach offers important advantages. First, given that it would build on existing legislation, it does not require further debates on the substance of the legislation: it would simply improve the payment provisions in the areas
already recognized for their public importance.303 Second, this approach draws on market mechanisms and does not require any additional government expenditures. This may be crucial in a time of
budget cuts. Finally, the number of relevant statutes means that
strengthening these seemingly minor provisions could provide counsel for quite a large number of people.
This approach to the unavailability of counsel has received less
attention from advocates of a right to civil counsel, who have focused
largely on State-funded solutions. In addition to directly funding representation, however, the State can also serve the function of enacting legislation that supplements the market. While the direct funding model may work well for defensive lawyering, the supplemental
approach may be more effective for affirmative work. As discussed
above, providing counsel for affirmative matters is particularly important in combatting abuses of private power. As scholars and policymakers continue to debate if and when civil counsel should be ap300. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2012); see also Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Appendix) (collecting federal statutory fee-shifting
provisions).
301. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia, 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001)
(ruling that serving as a catalyst for change in a defendant’s behavior is not sufficient to
obtain payment for lawyers); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 728 (1986) (ruling that defendants may condition a settlement for full injunctive relief on waiver of all fees for plaintiffs’ counsel); Marek, 473 U.S. at 10 (holding that a Rule 68 offer of judgment could cut off
entitlement to fees); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The
Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291 (1990); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith: How Fee-Shifting Statutes Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice (Though Some Judges Don’t Get It) 4-5
(Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 09-06-01, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407275.
302. I hesitate even to reference a legislative solution, as I do not want to distract from
the broader point regarding the vital role of lawyers checking private power. My intention
in this Article is to serve as a legal critic, not a reformer. See WEST, supra note 291, at 16062 (distinguishing legal critic from legal reformer).
303. For a more detailed argument that litigation pursuant to fee-shifting statutes is a
form of public interest lawyering, see Sabbeth, supra note 287, at 488-92.
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pointed, increased attention should be devoted to private power and
the role of lawyers who check it.
CONCLUSION
This Article sought to make two unique contributions to the literature on the role of counsel. First, it brought together different bodies
of research that had not previously been in dialogue: literature on the
right to counsel in civil proceedings and studies of the civil collateral
consequences of criminal convictions. The Supreme Court has joined
criminal justice scholars in taking note of the growth of collateral
consequences and of the need for criminal defense attorneys to advise
clients accordingly. This Article observed that recognition of the need
for counsel to protect clients against civil consequences of criminal
convictions—for example consequences for employment, housing, or
immigration status—may underscore an equal or greater need for
counsel in the proceedings that address those civil interests directly.
Additionally, social science research demonstrates that civil judgments, not only criminal convictions, result in collateral consequences. Given the economic exclusion and social stigma that can flow from
civil judgments, any valuation of the interests that civil lawyers protect should account for these collateral consequences.
Moving beyond the individual private interests at stake in civil and
criminal proceedings, the second, and more fundamental, contribution of
this Article concerns the function of lawyers as a check on the excesses of
power. This Article argued that the prioritization of criminal defense
counsel reflects a preoccupation with the dangers of State power and a
corresponding disregard for the dangers of private power. The prioritization of criminal over civil counsel assumes that the most valuable work of
a lawyer is to ward off the intrusion of the State. Yet this portrait of the
State as overly intrusive and lawyers as anti-regulation bulwarks is flawed.
Private actors control access to many of the basic resources essential for life and participation in democratic society—food, shelter,
medicine, information, communication, and physical safety. The actors who control such access enjoy tremendous power over the individuals who depend on it. A function of the State is to protect against
the abuse of such power through legislation and adjudication. Lawyers can serve as shields against State power, but they can also support the just and equal application of the State’s laws. Lawyers serve
a vital role in checking the power of private actors. Proponents of a
civil right to counsel might consider devoting increased attention to
lawyering against private parties. As private actors increasingly take
over public functions, their power over the lives of ordinary people
grows, and the need for lawyers to check that power intensifies.

